Socially Optimal Coordination: Characterization and Policy Implications by George-Marios Angeletos & Alessandro Pavan
Dynamic Managerial Compensation:







We characterize the ￿rm￿ s optimal contract for a manager who faces costly e⁄ort decisions
and whose ability to generate pro￿ts for the ￿rm changes stochastically over time. The optimal
contract is obtained as the solution to a dynamic mechanism design problem with hidden actions
and persistent private shocks to the manager￿ s productivity. When the manager is risk-neutral,
the optimal contract often entails a simple pay package that is linear in the ￿rm￿ s cash ￿ ows.
Furthermore, the power of incentives (i.e., the sensitivity of pay to performance) typically increases
over time, thus providing a possible justi￿cation for the practice of putting more stocks and
options in the pay packages of managers with longer tenure in the ￿rm. Building on the insights
from the risk-neutral case, we then explore the properties of optimal contracts for risk-averse
managers. We ￿nd that risk-aversion reduces, and in some cases can even reverse, the pro￿tability
of compensation schemes whose power of incentives increases with tenure.
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The contracts that the most successful ￿rms o⁄er to their top employees are designed taking into ac-
count that managerial ability to generate pro￿ts is bound to change over time. Shocks to managerial
productivity are expected to originate from variations in the business environment that are to a large
extent anticipated at the time of contracting but whose ultimate e⁄ect on managerial productivity
is the managers￿private information.
The questions that this paper addresses are the following: (i) How should ￿rms respond to such
shocks to managerial productivity? In particular should they induce their managers to work harder
when their productivity increases or rather when they experience a negative productivity shock? and
(ii) What type of compensation schemes induce the managers to respond to the shocks the way it is
optimal for the ￿rm, when both managerial e⁄ort and the shocks to managerial productivity are the
managers￿private information?
We assume that the ￿rm perfectly understands the value of not reneging on its promises and
thus commits to the compensation scheme that it o⁄ers to its managers at the time they are hired.
We then use a mechanism design approach to solve for the dynamic contract that maximizes the
expected sum of the ￿rm￿ s cash ￿ ows, net of managerial compensation.
Our ￿rst result provides a characterization of a class of contracts that permit the ￿rm to sustain
any implementable e⁄ort policy at minimum cost. These compensation schemes are the dynamic
analog of those proposed by La⁄ont and Tirole (1986) for a static setting. They specify a bonus
for each period that is paid conditional upon the ￿rm￿ s cash ￿ ows exceeding a critical target that
typically depends on past cash-￿ ows, as well as on possible messages sent by the manager over time.
The role of these messages is to permit the ￿rm to adjust its compensation scheme in response to
variations in managerial productivity.
Our second and third results identify conditions for a given e⁄ort policy to be implementable, as
well as for the possibility of implementing a given e⁄ort policy at minimal cost with a linear or a
pseudo-linear compensation scheme. By a linear scheme, we mean one whose compensation is linear
in performance, i.e., in cash ￿ ows; by a pseudo-linear scheme, we mean one that gives the manager
an utility that is linear in performance. While such schemes are less high-powered than the bonus
schemes described above, there are interesting cases where the optimal e⁄ort policy for the ￿rm can
indeed be implemented at minimum cost with such schemes.
Equipped with the aforementioned results, we then investigate the properties of pro￿t-maximizing
contracts, and in particular the optimality of seniority-based compensation schemes. The latter are
schemes that provide managers with a longer tenure in the ￿rm with more high-powered incentives,
thus inducing them to exert higher e⁄ort. To this purpose, we start by considering the case where
the manager is risk-neutral.1 We show that, for many processes of interest, the power of incentives
1Because the ￿rm contracts with the manager at the time the latter is already privately informed about his initial
productivity, interesting dynamics emerge even without risk aversion, and even without imposing limited liability on the
manager￿ s side. Private information at the contracting stage in fact implies that the ￿rm cannot "sell out" its business
1under the optimal contract indeed increases over time, thus providing a possible explanation for the
frequent practice of putting more stocks and options in the pay packages of managers with longer
tenure in the ￿rm (see, e.g., Gibbons and Murphy, 1991, Lippert and Porter, 1997, and Cremers and
Palia, 2010). Contrary to other explanations proposed in the literature (e.g., declining disutility of
e⁄ort or career concerns2), the optimality of seniority-based schemes is not driven by variations in
the managers￿preferences, or by variations in their outside option. It is a fairly natural property
of optimal contracts for stationary environments where managers possess private information about
their time-varying productivity. It results from an optimal allocation of informational rents over
time. In other words, it originates in the ￿rm￿ s desire to minimize the managers￿compensation while
preserving their incentives for both e⁄ort and information revelation.
The driving force behind this result is the assumption that the e⁄ect of a manager￿ s initial pro-
ductivity on his future productivity (formally captured by the impulse response of future productivity
to initial productivity, as explained in detail below) is expected to decline over time. For example,
when the manager￿ s private information evolves according to an AR(1) process, this assumption is
satis￿ed as long as the coe¢ cient of linear dependence is less than one. The property of declining
impulse responses implies that, to minimize a manager￿ s information rent, as computed at the time
of hiring, the ￿rm ￿nds it optimal to induce low e⁄ort in the early periods of the relationship and
higher e⁄ort in the subsequent periods. The reason is that the surplus that a manager who is highly
productive at the contracting stage can obtain by mimicking a less productive type increases in the
e⁄ort that the ￿rm asks the latter to exert, as shown ￿rst in La⁄ont and Tirole (1986). Indeed,
this surplus originates in the possibility of generating, on average, the same cash ￿ ows as the less
productive type by working less, thus economizing on the disutility of e⁄ort. It follows that, by
reducing the e⁄ort of those types who are less productive at the contracting stage, the ￿rm reduces
the rent that it must provide to the most productive types. The bene￿t of reducing the e⁄ort of the
least productive types is, however, higher when done in the early stages of the relationship, when the
e⁄ect of the initial productivity is still pronounced, than in the distant future, when such an e⁄ect is
weak. It follows that e⁄ort (and by implication the power of incentives in the compensation scheme
that sustains it) typically increases with tenure and gradually approaches the ￿rst-best level in the
long run.3
We also show that, when the manager is risk neutral, the optimal e⁄ort policy can often be
sustained by paying the manager according to a simple (state-contingent) linear scheme according
to the manager, for there does not exist a uniform price that extracts all surplus from all types of the manager.
2For a detailed analysis of career concerns incentives, see e.g., Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999).
3This property of declining distortions is quite common in the literature on dynamic contracting with adverse
selection (see, e.g., Baron and Besanko, 1984, Besanko, 1986, Courty and Li 2000, Battaglini, 2005, among others).
As explained in Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2011), the precise statistical property that is responsible for this result is
the assumption that the impulse responses of future productivity ￿t to initial productivity ￿1, decline over time, as
opposed to other properties of the stochastic process such as the degree of correlation between ￿1 and ￿t, or the ability
of ￿1 to forecast ￿t, as measured by the volatility of the forecast error of ￿t given ￿1: One of the key contributions of
the current paper is to study the extent to which such predictions are robust to the possibility that the agent is risk
averse.
2to which, in each period, the ￿rm pays the manager a ￿xed salary plus a bonus that is linear in the
￿rm￿ s cash ￿ ows (or, equivalently, in the ￿rm￿ s stock price, assuming that the latter also depends on
managerial e⁄ort). When the manager￿ s productivity evolves according to an ARIMA process (more
generally, according to any process where the impulse responses exhibit a certain separability with
respect to the initial productivity), the slope of the linear scheme increases deterministically over
time, i.e., it depends only on the manager￿ s initial productivity and on the number of periods he has
been working for the ￿rm. More generally, though, the optimal contract requires that the manager
be given the possibility of proposing changes to his pay over time in response to the shocks to his
productivity.4
Building on the insights from the risk-neutral case, we then explore the properties of optimal
compensation schemes for risk-averse managers. We ￿nd that, other things equal, risk-aversion
reduces (and in some cases can even reverse) the pro￿tability of seniority-based compensation schemes
whose power of incentives increases, on average, over time. The reason is that these schemes entail
a high sensitivity of compensation to performance precisely in those periods in which the manager
faces high uncertainty about his ability to generate cash ￿ ows for the ￿rm. Indeed, while a manager￿ s
productivity at the time he is hired is a fairly good predictor of his productivity in the near future,
it is a fairly poor predictor of his productivity in the distant future. Increasing the sensitivity of
compensation to performance over time thus means exposing the manager to a great deal of risk.
Whether risk-averse managers with a longer tenure in the ￿rm receive more or less high-powered
incentives than younger ones then depends on the interaction between their degree of risk-aversion
and the dynamics of the impulse responses of the process governing the evolution of managerial
productivity.
We also ￿nd that, contrary to the risk-neutral case, the e⁄ort that the ￿rm asks a manager to
exert after the ￿rst period need not be monotone in his productivity, nor need it converge to the
￿rst-best level in the long run.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 character-
izes a compensation scheme that sustains all implementable e⁄ort policy at minimum cost. Section 4
provides conditions for an e⁄ort policy to be implementable, and for the possibility of implementing
it at minimum cost with linear and pseudo-linear schemes. Section 5 characterizes the properties
of optimal contracts and discusses the e⁄ect of risk aversion on the optimality of seniority-based
schemes. Section 6 discusses the related literature. Section 7 concludes with a few ￿nal remarks. All
proofs are in the Appendix at the end of the manuscript.
4The idea that a manager must be given the possibility of proposing changes to his reward package is consistent with
the recent empirical literature on managerial compensation where it is found that this practice has become frequent in
the last decade (see, among others, Kuhnen and Zwiebel, 2008, and Bebchuck and Fried, 2004).
32 The Model
2.1 The environment
Players, actions and information. The ￿rm￿ s shareholders (hereafter referred to as the principal)
hire a manager (the agent) to work on a project over T periods, where T can be either ￿nite or in￿nite.
In each period t 2 N+ the agent receives some private information ￿t 2 ￿t ￿ R about his ability to
generate pro￿ts for the ￿rm (his type), and then chooses e⁄ort et 2 E = R.5





￿t￿1 [￿t ￿ ct]:
where ￿ < 1 is the common discount factor, ￿t = ￿t + et is the period-t cash ￿ ow, ct is the period-t
compensation to the agent, ￿T ￿ (￿t)T
t=1; and cT ￿ (ct)T
t=1.6 The function UP also corresponds to
the principal￿ s Bernoulli utility function used to evaluate lotteries over (￿T;cT). Both ￿T and eT are
the agent￿ s private information. On the contrary, the stream of cash ￿ ows ￿T is veri￿able, which
implies that the agent can be rewarded as a function of the ￿rm￿ s cash ￿ ows. By choosing e⁄ort et in
period t, the agent su⁄ers a disutility  (et). The agent￿ s preferences over (lotteries over) streams of
consumption levels cT and streams of e⁄ort choices eT ￿ (et)T
t=1 are described by an expected utility











where V : R ! R and all vt : R ! R functions are strictly increasing, weakly concave, surjective (i.e.,
onto) and di⁄erentiable. This representation covers as special cases the situation where the agent
has time-additive-separable preferences for consumption smoothing (vt strictly concave, V linear) as
well as the case where the agent is risk-averse but cares only about his total compensation (V strictly
concave, vt linear). The case of risk neutrality corresponds to both v and V linear. As standard,
the aforementioned speci￿cation presumes time consistency. In what follows, we will thus assume
that, at each history ht, the agent maximizes the expectation of UA(cT;eT); where the expectation
is taken with respect to whatever information is available to the agent at history ht.
5That e⁄ort can take negative values should not raise concerns: e⁄ort simply stands for the e⁄ect of the manager￿ s
activity on the ￿rm￿ s performance, which can be either positive or negative.
6Note that, because ￿t is not restricted to be independent of past shocks ￿
t￿1 ￿ (￿1;:::;￿t￿1), there is no loss of
generality in assuming that ￿t depends only on ￿t, as opposed to the entire history ￿
t = (￿1;:::;￿t): To see this, suppose
that ￿t = ft(￿
t)+ht(e
t) for some functions ft : R
t ! R and ht : R




t). The assumption that e⁄ort in period t a⁄ects the cash ￿ ows only in period t is more restrictive,
although common in the literature. This assumption is not essential for our results. We refer the reader to the earlier
version of the paper (Garrett and Pavan, 2009) for the analysis of the case where ￿t is a function of the entire history
e
t of past e⁄ort choices.
7As is common in the literature, we equate the agent￿ s period-t consumption ct with the compensation from the
principal. In other words, we assume that the agent cannot secretely save.
4Stochastic process. In each period t, ￿t is drawn from a cumulative distribution function
Ft(￿j￿t￿1), where ￿t￿1 ￿ (￿1;:::;￿t￿1) 2 ￿t￿1 ￿ ￿t￿1
s=1￿s with ￿s = [￿s;￿ ￿s] is the history of past
productivity levels. We assume that, for any t any ￿t￿1; Ft(￿j￿t￿1) is absolutely continuous over R and
strictly increasing with density ft(￿tj￿t￿1) > 0 over a connected set8 Supp[Ft
￿
￿j￿t￿1￿
] ￿ ￿t; and then
denote by ￿t(￿t￿1) ￿ inffSupp[Ft
￿
￿j￿t￿1￿
]g and ￿ ￿t(￿t￿1) ￿ supfSupp[Ft
￿
￿j￿t￿1￿
]g the in￿mum and
supremum of the support. We also assume that, for each t; Ft(￿tj￿t￿1) is continuously di⁄erentiable
in ￿t. Hereafter, we identify the process governing the evolution of the agent￿ s productivity with the
collection of kernels F ￿ hFti
T
t=1. For each t, we then let
Rt ￿
n




]; all l = 2;:::;t
o
denote the set of productivity histories that are consistent with the process F. We write ￿ = ￿T
and, similarly, R = RT.
We now de￿ne the impulse responses corresponding to the process F as follows. For any t

























These J functions are the nonlinear analogs of the familiar constant linear impulse responses for
autoregressive processes. For example, when productivity evolves according to an AR(1) process,
i.e., when ￿t = ￿￿t￿1 + "t; when ￿ is a scalar and (~ "s)T
s=1 is a sequence of independent random
variables, the impulse response of ￿￿ on ￿t; ￿ > t, is simply J￿
t = ￿￿￿t: More generally, the impulse
response J￿
t (￿￿) of ￿￿ to ￿t captures the total e⁄ect of an in￿nitesimal variation of ￿t on ￿￿, taking
into account all e⁄ects on intermediate types ￿￿￿1
>t = (￿t+1;:::;￿￿￿1):9 In the special case of a Markov
process, because each Im
l (￿m) is equal to zero for all l < m ￿ 1 and depends on ￿m only through
(￿m;￿m￿1); the impulse response J￿
t (￿￿) reduces to a function of (￿t;:::;￿￿) and can be conveniently
written as J￿
t (￿t;￿t+1;:::;￿￿) = ￿￿
k=t+1Ik








t￿1)] stands for the support of the distribution Ft(￿j￿
t￿1); de￿ned to be the smallest
compact subset of R whose complement has probability zero. Note that the kernels Ft(￿j￿
t￿1) are de￿ned for all
possible histories ￿
t￿1 2 ￿
t￿1 including those that have zero measure from an ex ante perspective.




>t￿1 = (￿t;:::;￿s) for any periods s and t, s ￿ t.
5As anticipated in the Introduction, these impulse response functions play a key role in determining
the dynamics of the pro￿t-maximizing contract. Throughout, we will assume that the process F
satis￿es the property of ￿￿rst-order stochastic dominance in types￿: for all t ￿ 2, ￿t￿1 > ￿t￿10
implies Ft(￿tj￿t￿1) ￿ Ft(￿tj￿t￿10) for all ￿t: This assumption in turn implies that J￿
t (￿￿) ￿ 0 for any
t and ￿; ￿ ￿ t; any ￿￿ 2 R￿.
Technical assumptions. To validate a certain dynamic envelope theorem (see Pavan, Segal, and
Toikka 2011 for details), and guarantee interior solutions, we will also make the following technical
assumptions. We will assume that the sets ￿t and the functions J￿
t (￿) are uniformly bounded, in the
following sense: there exist nonnegative scalars B1;B2 < +1 such that j￿tj < B1 and J￿
t (￿￿) < B2,
all t and ￿, ￿ ￿ t, all ￿￿ 2 R￿.10 Lastly, we will impose the following conditions on the disutility
function  . Firstly,   (e) = 0 for all e ￿ 0. Secondly,   is continuously di⁄erentiable over R. Thirdly,
there exists a scalar ￿ e > 0 such that (i)  0 (￿ e) > 1, and (ii)   is thrice continuously di⁄erentiable
over (0; ￿ e) with  00(e) > 0 and  000(e) ￿ 0 for all e 2 (0; ￿ e). Finally, there exist scalars C > 0 and
L > 1 such that  (e) = Le ￿ C for all e > ￿ e. These conditions are satis￿ed, for example, when
￿ e > 1,  (e) = (1=2)e2 for all e 2 (0; ￿ e), and  (e) = ￿ ee ￿ ￿ e2=2 for all e > ￿ e: As mentioned above,
these conditions (which are stronger than needed but easy to verify) guarantee that the agent￿ s
payo⁄satis￿es a certain equi-Lipschitz continuity condition which in turn permits us to conveniently
express the value function through a di⁄erentiable envelope formula.
2.2 The mechanism design problem
The principal￿ s problem consists of choosing a mechanism detailing for each period t a recommend-
ation for the agent￿ s e⁄ort along with a level of consumption where both e⁄ort and consumption
possibly depend on the history of observed cash ￿ ows ￿t and on messages sent by the agent over
time.
By the Revelation Principle, we restrict attention to direct revelation mechanisms for which a
truthful and obedient strategy is optimal for each type ￿1 of the agent. Hereafter, we refer to any
such mechanism as incentive compatible.11 Letting ￿t = ￿t
￿=1￿￿, with ￿￿ = f￿￿ 2 R : ￿￿ = ￿￿ + e;
￿￿ 2 ￿￿; e 2 Eg denoting the set of possible period-t feasible cash ￿ ows, a direct mechanism
￿ = h￿t;stiT
t=1 thus consists of a collection of functions ￿t : ￿t￿￿t￿1 ! E and st : ￿t￿￿t ! R such
that ￿t(￿t;￿t￿1) is the recommended level of e⁄ort for period t given the agent￿ s reports ￿t and the
observed history of cash ￿ ows ￿t￿1, while st(￿t;￿t￿1;￿t) is the principal￿ s payment (equivalently, the
agent￿ s consumption) at the end of period t given the reports ￿t and the cash ￿ ows ￿t = (￿t￿1;￿t):
10Throughout, given any function g : R





)] will denote the expected value of the
function g(~ ￿
T
) given the unique probability measure over ￿
T that corresponds to the kernels F starting from history
￿
t:
11A truthful and obedient strategy prescribes that the agent truthfully reports his private information and follows
the principal￿ s e⁄ort recommendation at each history. Such a strategy is said to be optimal for type ￿1 if it maximizes
type ￿1￿ s expected payo⁄ among all possible (measurable) strategies. By the principle of optimality, in any incentive-
compatible mechanism, with F-probability one, truthful and obedient behavior must remain optimal also at future
histories that are consistent with truthful and obedient behavior in the past.
6Note that st(￿t;￿t￿1;￿t) depends on both past and current cash ￿ ows: With a slight abuse of notation,
for any ￿t 2 Rt, we then denote by et(￿t) ￿ ￿(￿t;￿t(￿t)) the equilibrium e⁄ort choice for period
t and by ct(￿t) = st(￿t;￿t(￿t)) the equilibrium consumption level for period t, given ￿t; where
￿t(￿t) = (￿s(￿s))t
s=1 with ￿s(￿s) de￿ned recursively by ￿s(￿s) = ￿s + es(￿s) all s ￿ t.
The timing of play in each period t is the following:
￿ At the beginning of period t; the agent learns ￿t 2 ￿t;
￿ The agent then sends a report ^ ￿t 2 ￿t;
￿ The mechanism reacts by prescribing an e⁄ort choice ￿t(^ ￿
t
;￿t￿1) and a contingent reward
scheme st(^ ￿
t
;￿t￿1;￿) : ￿t ! R;
￿ The agent privately chooses e⁄ort et; the cash ￿ ows ￿t = ￿t + et are then observed, and the
compensation ct = st(￿t;￿t) is paid and consumed.
The principal o⁄ers the mechanism ￿ at date 1; after the agent has observed the ￿rst realization
￿1 of the process F:12 If the agent refuses to participate in the mechanism ￿; both the agent and
the principal receive their outside options, which we assume to be equal to zero. If, instead, the
agent accepts ￿; he then stays in the relationship in all subsequent periods.13 In the terminology of
mechanism design, we refer to a mechanism for which participation is optimal for each type ￿1 as
individually rational.
De￿nition 1 We say that the compensation scheme s ￿ hst(￿)i
t=T
t=1 implements the e⁄ort policy
e ￿ het(￿)i
t=T
t=1 if any mechanism ￿ = h￿t;stiT
t=1 in which the compensation scheme is s and the
recommendation policy ￿ satis￿es ￿t(￿t;￿t￿1) = et(￿t) for any (￿t;￿t￿1) such that ￿t 2 Rt and
￿s = ￿s+es(￿s) all s ￿ t￿1, is incentive-compatible and individually-rational for the agent. We say
that the policy e is implementable if there exists a compensation scheme that implements it.
3 Cost-minimizing compensation schemes
We start by characterizing a compensation scheme that implements all implementable e⁄ort policies
at minimal cost for the principal.14
12As explained above, this assumption implies that the principal cannot simply sell out the ￿rm to the agent even
in the absence of limited liability constraints and in the presence of risk neutrality.
13That participation must be guaranteed only in period one is clearly not restrictive when the principal can ask
the agent to post bonds. Below, we will discuss situations/implementations where, even in the absence of bonding,
participation can be guaranteed after any history consistent with truthful and obedient play in past periods.
14Throughout, for any pair of period t;s s ￿ t; any history ￿
t 2 ￿
t; any measurable function g : ￿








the expectation of g(~ ￿
s
) given the unique measure over ￿
s that corresponds to the process de￿ned by
the kernels F and that starts in period t with history ￿
t:






























for F-almost all ￿T








































































for all t ￿ 2, all ￿t 2 Rt. Consider the compensation scheme s de￿ned as follows: in each period
t; given the reports ￿t 2 ￿t and the observed cash ￿ows ￿t 2 Rt, the principal pays the agent a
compensation st(￿t;￿t) = c
opt
t (￿t;e) if ￿t 2 Rt and ￿t ￿ ￿t(￿t;e) ￿ ￿t+et(￿t) and charges the agent a
su¢ ciently low penalty otherwise. The compensation scheme s described above implements the policy
e at minimum cost for the principal.
By de￿nition, if a mechanism ￿ exists which implements the policy e, then at any period t
and for F-almost all truthful histories15 ￿t; the agent￿ s expected payo⁄ in ￿ under a truthful and
obedient strategy must coincide with the value function V ￿(￿t) de￿ned to be the supremum of the
agent￿ s expected payo⁄ in ￿, given the truthful history ￿t; among all possible strategies. The proof
in the Appendix then uses the envelope theorem for dynamic stochastic problems of Pavan, Segal
and Toikka (2011) to establish that, after any truthful history ￿t￿1; V ￿(￿t￿1;￿) must be Lipschitz


















15A truthful history is one that is reached by reporting truthfully and following the principal￿ s e⁄ort recommendations
in each previous period. Without loss, these histories can be denoted by the realized sequence of productivities ￿
t:
8for F-almost every truthful history ￿t: Using the fact that, in any incentive-compatible mechanism
￿; at F-almost every truthful history ￿t








and iterating across periods then permits us to establish that, for F-almost all histories ￿T, the











+ V ￿(￿1) (5)
with V ￿(￿1) nonnegative so as to guarantee participation by all period-1 types. This means that the
utility that the agent derives from his compensation is essentially uniquely determined by the e⁄ort
policy e, up to a nonnegative constant.
Given the property above, if the principal replaces the original mechanism ￿ implementing the
policy e with one where the compensation is as in the proposition then (i) the agent continues to have
the right incentives to report truthfully and follow the principal￿ s e⁄ort recommendations (this step
follows from replication arguments similar to those that establish the Revelation Principle, adapted
to the environment considered here) and (ii) the cost to the principal is no greater than under the
original scheme ￿, thus establishing the result.
The value of Proposition 1 is twofold: it characterizes the cost to the principal of sustaining
any implementable policy e; and it shows that all implementable e⁄ort policies can be sustained by
o⁄ering the agent a compensation scheme that, in each period t, pays a bonus conditional upon the
period-t cash ￿ ows exceeding a target that depends on the history of reports about the manager￿ s
productivity.
Interestingly, note that many e⁄ort policies can also be implemented with compensation schemes
that are less severe than the bonus schemes of Proposition 1. For example, in the following sections
we will consider implementation by schemes in which compensation is linear in the cash ￿ ows. More
generally, most e⁄ort policy that can be implemented by a bonus scheme can also be implemented
by a scheme that is smooth in the cash ￿ ows￿ in other words, the discontinuity in the bonus scheme
is not an essential property of the implementation.16
It is also worthwhile noticing that communication between the agent and the principal, while a
natural property of many organizations, is not essential. As long as equilibrium pro￿ts ￿t(￿t￿1;￿;e)
are monotone in current productivity ￿t (a property that we will show to hold under the optimal
e⁄ort policies) then the agent￿ s productivity can be ￿inferred￿by the observed cash ￿ ows, in which
case the same e⁄ort policy can be sustained without explicit communication.
16This follows from the fact that any step function can be approximated arbitrarily well in the L-1 norm by a smooth
function preserving the agent￿ s incentives.
9Now note that a necessary condition for the compensation policy copt(￿;e) to solve program (2)
in Proposition 1 is that it satis￿es the inverse Euler equation in Corollary 1 below. (The proof in
the Appendix adapts arguments similar to those in Rogerson (1985) to the present environment.17)
Corollary 1 Given any policy e; the compensation copt(￿;e) solves program (2) in Proposition 1 only























Building on the results in the previous section we now provide conditions for a given e⁄ort policy to
be implementable. We start with the following de￿nition.
De￿nition 2 The recommendation policy ￿ (de￿ned over ￿T ￿ RT) is an extension of the e⁄ort
policy e if (i) for any t; any ￿t 2 ￿t; ￿t(￿t;￿t￿1) is independent of past cash ￿ows ￿t￿1 (and hence
denoted by ￿t(￿t)), and (ii) for any t any ￿t 2 Rt, ￿t(￿t) = et(￿t):
The extension ￿ is bounded if there exists a constant M > 0 such that ￿t(￿t) < M, all t; all
￿t 2 ￿t:
An extension is thus a recommendation policy that (i) is insensitive to the observed cash ￿ ows
and (ii) is de￿ned for all possible histories ￿T 2 ￿T, including those that have zero measure under
the process F, and coincides with the policy e with F-probability one. The role of such extensions
is to specify a behavior for the agent at all histories, including those that can be reached only by
departing from truthtelling. We then have the following result.















































5[￿t ￿ ^ ￿t] ￿ 0 (7)
for any t, any ￿t 2 Rt; any ^ ￿
t
2 ￿t: In addition, assume that one of the following conditions holds:
(i) the process F is Markov; (ii) each ￿t(￿t) depends on ￿t only through ￿1. In each of these cases,
the policy e is implementable.
17Note that Condition (6) holds irrespective of whether the agent￿ s perferences are time-additively separable.
18The only role played by the boundeness of the extension ￿ is to validate a certain one-stage-deviation principle in
case T = 1: Note that, because ￿ ow payo⁄s are potentially unbounded, the standard version of the one-stage-deviation
principle does not apply here.
10Note that the single-crossing conditions in the propositions are trivially satis￿ed when, in each
period, the e⁄ort that the ￿rm recommends is nondecreasing in the history of reported productivity.
More generally, these conditions are also satis￿ed when, in the continuation game starting with an
arbitrary history (￿t;^ ￿
t￿1
;et￿1), e⁄ort increases, on average, with the agent￿ s report about his current
productivity, where the average (both across time and productivity sequences) is computed using
the impulse response functions.19
To appreciate the idea behind the result in the proposition, consider ￿rst the case where the
process is Markov. In this case, whether or not the agent has been truthful in the past is irrelevant
for the incentives he faces in the continuation game that starts after any history (￿t;^ ￿
t￿1
;et￿1).
Suppose, then, that the principal o⁄ers a scheme of the type described in Proposition 1; that is, in
each period t, given the reports ^ ￿
t
2 ￿t, the principal pays a bonus ct(^ ￿
t
) if the current cash ￿ ow
exceeds the target ￿t = ^ ￿t+￿t(^ ￿
t
) and charges the agent a su¢ ciently large penalty otherwise. Faced
with this scheme, the e⁄ort that the agent exerts in each period t is determined entirely by the history
of reports ^ ￿
t
made over time, and by the agent￿ s current type ￿t and is given by ^ et = ￿t(^ ￿
t
)+^ ￿t ￿￿t,
all t: Then let U#(￿t;^ ￿
t￿1
;^ ￿t) denote the agent￿ s expected payo⁄in the continuation game that starts
in period t with history (￿t;^ ￿
t￿1
) when, in period t, the agent sends the report ^ ￿t; he then chooses
e⁄ort ^ et = ￿t(^ ￿
t
) + ^ ￿t ￿ ￿t, and then starting from period t + 1 onward he follows a truthful and
obedient strategy. The proof in the Appendix veri￿es that, when the single-crossing conditions in












￿t ￿ ^ ￿t
i
￿ 0,
all ￿t 2 Rt; ^ ￿
t
2 ￿t: As is well known, this endogenous single-crossing condition on derivatives implies
that U#(￿t;^ ￿
t￿1
;￿t) ￿ U#(￿t;^ ￿
t￿1
;^ ￿t) all ￿t 2 Rt; ^ ￿
t
2 ￿t; meaning that no one-shot deviation from
the truthful and obedient strategy is ever pro￿table for the agent. Starting from this result, one can
then verify that all other deviations are also unpro￿table, thus establishing the implementability of
the proposed e⁄ort policy.20
Next consider the case where the process is possibly non-Markov, but where the e⁄ort policy
depends only on ￿1. The proof in the Appendix shows that one can construct compensation schemes
in which the agent is asked to report only his initial type and such that the utility that he derives
from the payments he receives over time is linear in the cash ￿ ows ￿t, t > 1. The idea here is the
19Note that the single-crossing conditions in (7) are trivially satis￿ed when, given each productivity sequence ￿
T, with
￿￿ 2 Supp[F￿(￿j￿








t￿1;￿;￿t+1 :::;￿￿)) is nondecreasing in
the period-t report ^ ￿t (ex-post monotonicity). More generally, the single-crossing conditions in (7) only require that
the expectation (over ￿
T) of the above intertemporal average changes signs only once at ^ ￿t = ￿t.
20Note that the scheme described above, contrary to that in Proposition 1, does not constrain the agent to report
only feasible sequences of types ￿
T 2 R. Allowing the agent to report also types that are inconsistent with the process
F is just a trick that permits us to establish the suboptimality of one-stage deviations from the truthful and obedient
strategy after any history, including those that entailed a deviation in the past. Together with continuity a in￿nity,
this in turn establishes the optimality of the truthful and obedient strategy, and hence the implementability of the
desired e⁄ort policy.
11following. First, because the policy depends only on ￿1; the agent does not need to report anything
to the principal after the ￿rst period. This eliminates the complication stemming from the fact that,
with non-Markov processes, verifying the agent￿ s incentives for truthtelling is typically hard due to
the fact that his continuation payo⁄ may depend on the entire history of past types. Second, by
using a scheme that makes the agent￿ s payo⁄, gross of his disutility of e⁄ort, linear in the cash ￿ ows
￿t; t > 1, the principal can control the agent￿ s incentives for e⁄ort without the need to set bonuses
that depend on past types (i.e., without communicating with the agent after the ￿rst period). It
su¢ ces to set the sensitivity of the the payo⁄ to each cash ￿ ow ￿t; t > 1; equal to  0 (￿t(￿1)): It is
then easy to see that, conditional on having reported truthfully in the ￿rst period, and irrespective
of the e⁄ort exerted in the preceding periods, at any period t > 1; the agent ￿nds it optimal to
choose a level of e⁄ort et = ￿t(￿1) for which the marginal disutility is equal to the marginal increase
in compensation. The only di¢ culty for the principal is then to induce the agent to report truthfully
in the ￿rst period. When the e⁄ort policy satis￿es the single-crossing condition in the proposition21,
this can be achieved by committing to pay, in addition to the compensation described above, a
bonus in period one conditional upon the period-1 cash ￿ ow exceeding a target ￿1 = ￿1+￿1(￿1) that
depends only on the ￿rst period announcement. It is important to recognize that, while the schemes
described above do facilitate the veri￿cation of the implementability of a policy, they are not essential
for its sustainability: for example, any e⁄ort policy that can be sustained with a scheme of the type
described above can also be sustained with a bonus scheme of the type described in Proposition 1,
at a weakly lower cost for the principal.
Lastly, note that the case where the e⁄ort policy is independent of the agent￿ s reports after the
￿rst period is of particular interest. As we will show below, the optimal policy takes this form for
example when the agent is risk neutral and the process for the agent￿ s productivity is separable in
the ￿rst component, in the following sense.
De￿nition 3 The process F is separable in the ￿rst component (SFC) if each impulse response
function Jt
1(￿t) depends on ￿t only through ￿1, which in turn is the case when the process F admits the
following representation ￿t = ￿t(￿1)+￿t("2;:::;"t) for some functions ￿t : ￿1 ! R and ￿t : Et ! R,
with the shock " drawn independently from ￿1:
Note that the family of SFC processes includes all ARIMA processes: in this case, each impulse
response Jt
1 is simply a scalar.
4.1 Implementability (at minimum cost) with linear and pseudo-linear schemes
Before turning to the properties of optimal policies, we conclude this section with a result concerning
the possibility of implementing certain e⁄ort policies with linear and pseudo-linear schemes. By the
former, we mean compensation schemes in which the total compensation that the agent receives is
linear in the cash ￿ ows. By the latter, we mean compensation schemes in which the utility that the
21Note that, when the policy depends only on ￿1, the only relevant single-crossing condition is the one for t = 1.
12agent derives from his compensation is linear in the cash ￿ ows.22 The reason for looking at these
schemes is twofold. Many compensation packages used in the real world based on a time-varying
combination of stocks and options are known to give rise to linear sensitivities of compensation to
￿rm￿ s performance, as measured for example by cash ￿ ows and stock prices. Second, pseudo-linear
schemes (which of course coincide with linear schemes when the agent is risk neutral) provide a
desirable form of robustness. They guarantee that the agent ￿nds it optimal to report truthfully and
choose the desired level of e⁄ort even if he is concerned about the possibility that the ￿rm￿ s cash
￿ ows may depend not only on his productivity and e⁄ort but also of noise that is beyond his control.
For example, such schemes continue to implement the desired e⁄ort policy even if the agent believes
the cash ￿ ows to be given by ￿t = ￿t+et+￿t where ￿t is transitory noise, independent of the process
F and of the agent￿ s e⁄ort decisions. Motivated by the aforementioned considerations, we then have
the following result.




























[￿t ￿ ^ ￿t] ￿ 0 (8)
for any t, any ￿t 2 Rt; any ^ ￿
t
2 ￿t. In addition, assume that one of the following conditions holds:
(i) the process F is Markov; (ii) each ￿t(￿t) depends on ￿t only through ￿1. In each of these cases,
the policy e can be implemented at minimal cost for the principal with an appropriately designed
pseudo-linear scheme.
First note that the single crossing conditions in the proposition are stronger than those in Pro-
position 2. These schemes thus permit the principal to implement fewer e⁄ort policies than the
corresponding bonus schemes of Proposition 2. Nonetheless, there are interesting cases where the
optimal e⁄ort policies can indeed be implemented with such schemes, as will be shown below.
Next note that these schemes are designed so as to achieve multiple goals at once. First, they
undo the agent￿ s risk-aversion by making his payo⁄, gross of the cost of e⁄ort, linear in the cash-
￿ ows ￿t; t ￿ 1: By setting the sensitivity to each cash ￿ ow equal to ￿t(￿t) =  0(￿t(￿t)) such linearity
guarantees that, conditional on having reported truthfully, and irrespective of past e⁄ort choices, the
agent ￿nds it optimal to exert the right level of e⁄ort, thus taking care of the moral-hazard part of the
problem. Second, these schemes are designed so as to induce truthtelling. This is obtained through
a careful design of the part of the compensation that (in terms of the agent￿ s payo⁄) is independent
of the realized cash ￿ ow but which depends on the reported productivity. This takes care of the
adverse selection part of the problem. Lastly, these schemes are designed so that the compensation
22The discussion after Proposition 2 mentioned already some of the advantages of linear and pseudo-linear schemes.
However, there we restricted attention to policies that depend only on ￿1. Furthermore, we did not address the question
of what conditions guarantee that such schemes implement the desired e⁄ort policies at minimal cost for the principal.
13the agent receives over time is the one that minimizes the cost to the principal. This is obtained by
distributing the compensation over time according to Rogerson￿ s inverse Euler condition, as de￿ned
in Corollary 1, thus taking care of the optimal consumption smoothing part of the problem.
To illustrate, consider for simplicity the case where V is linear but where each vt is possibly
strictly concave, thus maintaining a preference for consumption smoothing, while making the payo⁄
time-additively separable. Let ￿ be any extension of the desired e⁄ort policy e from R to ￿. Let
copt (￿;￿) be the cost-minimizing allocation of consumption over time, as de￿ned in the program of
Proposition 1, with all policies and corresponding constraints naturally extended from R to ￿: Then




















+  0(￿t(￿t))[￿t ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿t(￿t)]
￿
. (9)
It is easy to see that, under such a scheme, in each period t; conditional on having reported truthfully,
the agent has the right incentives for choosing the desired level of e⁄ort ￿t(￿t). It is also easy to see










which is exactly the compensation that minimizes the cost to the principal among all those that are
consistent with the agent￿ s incentive compatibility, as indicated in Proposition 1. As shown in the
proof in the Appendix, that the e⁄ort policy satis￿es the single crossing conditions in the proposition
in turn guarantees that, when either the process is Markov, or the policy depends only on ￿1, (i) the
agent has the right incentives to report all his types truthfully, and (ii) each type ￿1 has the incentive
to participate, thus establishing implementability of the desired e⁄ort policy.
Next, consider the special case where the agent is risk neutral (both V and each vt linear). It is
worthwhile noticing that, while in this case the particular way the compensation is distributed over
time is irrelevant, certain choices have the advantage of guaranteeing that, even if the agent had the
option to leave the relationship after the ￿rst period, he would never ￿nd it optimal to do so. To see
this, consider for example the case where F is Markov, R = ￿; and T is ￿nite. By committing to
pay the agent in each period a compensation
st(￿t;￿t) = St(￿t) + ￿t(￿t)￿t (10)
with23





23The functions Ht(￿;￿) (with domain ￿
t) are de￿ned analogously to the functions Ht(￿
t;e) in (3) by replacing the
equilibrium policy e with the extension ￿ and by letting the lower bounds of integration be ￿t as opposed to ￿t(￿
t￿1):
14if t > 1 and




















if t = 1, the principal guarantees that, after each period t, the agent￿ s continuation payo⁄ under a






















irrespective of whether or not the agent has been truthful and obedient in the past. Because the
latter is clearly positive, this implies that the agent never ￿nds it optimal to leave the ￿rm.
When the agent is risk-averse, the pseudo-linear schemes give the agent a payo⁄ which is linear
in the cash ￿ ows but typically entail a non-linear compensation. However, when the single crossing
conditions of Proposition 3 hold, it may be possible to implement the desired e⁄ort policy with a
payment scheme where the compensation itself is linear in the cash ￿ ows. To illustrate, consider
again the case where V is linear but where each vt is strictly concave and let wt(￿) ￿ v￿1
t (￿). Then

























 0(￿t(￿t))[￿t ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿t(￿t)].










with equality if and only if ￿t = ￿t + ￿t(￿t), where sPL is the pseudo-linear scheme de￿ned in (9).
Faced with the above linear scheme, the agent￿ s payo⁄under a truthful and obedient strategy is thus
the same as when he faces the corresponding pseudo-linear scheme, whereas his payo⁄ under any
other plan is weakly lower. This means that, whenever the desired e⁄ort policy is implementable
at minimal cost with a pseudo-linear scheme it is also implementable at minimal cost with a linear
scheme. Given the popularity of linear schemes in the real world and in the managerial compensation
literature, the above result is somewhat reassuring.
5 Pro￿t-maximizing e⁄ort policies
5.1 Risk-neutrality
Equipped with the results in the previous section, we now characterize the e⁄ort policies that max-
imize the ￿rm￿ s expected cash ￿ ows, net of the cost of managerial compensation. We start by
characterizing optimal policies for risk-neutral agents. Recall that, by de￿nition, in any mechanism
15that is incentive-compatible for the agent, the payo⁄ that each type ￿1 expects under a truthful and
obedient strategy must coincide with the value function. Applying (4) to t = 1, the latter in turn
must satisfy

















ds + V ￿(￿1) (11)
for all ￿1: Integrating (11) by parts, we then have that the expected surplus that the principal must
























where ￿(￿1) ￿ [1 ￿ F1(￿1)]=f1(￿1) denotes the inverse hazard rate of the ￿rst-period distribution.
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￿ 0 for all t all ￿t under FOSD, we then have that the e⁄ort policy that maximizes
(12) can be obtained by pointwise maximization of E[UP] and is given in the next proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the agent is risk neutral. (i) Let e￿ be the e⁄ort policy implicitly de￿ned,
for all t all ￿t 2 Rt; by24
 0(e￿






Suppose that the policy e￿ is implementable. Then, under any optimal contract for the principal, e￿
is sustained with F-probability one.
(ii) The following conditions guarantee that the policy e￿ is implementable: (a) the process F





nonincreasing. Under these conditions, the policy e￿ can also be implemented by a linear scheme.25
Furthermore, by committing to pay the agent in each period according to (10) the principal guarantees
that the agent never ￿nds it optimal to leave the relationship.
First, consider part (i). It is easy to see that the policy e￿ maximizes (12). That, when it is
implementable, e￿ is sustained under any optimal contract for the principal then follows from the
fact that the principal￿ s payo⁄ in any mechanism that is incentive-compatible for the agent is given
24The formula in (13) presumes that the e⁄ort e
￿(￿
t) implicitely de￿ned by (13) is strictly positive, which is the case











25The extension ￿ of the policy e
￿ from R to ￿ is given in the Appendix.
16by (12), together with the fact that, from Proposition 1, there exists a compensation scheme s￿ that
implements e￿ and that gives the lowest period-1 type ￿1 an expected payo⁄ equal to his outside
option, in which case V ￿(￿1) = 0:





is nonincreasing, then each function e￿
t(￿t) is nondecreasing. In the Appendix, we show
that, when this is the case, there always exists an extension ￿ of e￿ from R to ￿ that satis￿es not
only the single-crossing conditions (7) of Proposition 2 but also the more stringent conditions (8) of
Proposition 3. The results in those propositions then imply that when F is Markov, or it is separable
in the ￿rst component (SFC)￿ in which case each e￿
t(￿t) and hence also each corresponding ￿t(￿t)
depends on ￿t only through ￿1￿ then the policy e￿ can be implemented both by the bonus schemes
of Proposition 1 and by the linear schemes described in (10). That, in this case, participation can
be guaranteed not only in the ￿rst period but also in any subsequent period then follows from what
discussed after Proposition 3.




is nondecreasing in ￿t is trivially satis-
￿ed, for example, when the density of the ￿rst period distribution F1 is log-concave and the process F
is ARIMA. As anticipated above, in this case, the impulse response functions Jt
1 are scalars and the
dynamics of e⁄ort under the optimal contract is entirely deterministic. The implementation of the
optimal contract is then particularly simple. In period one, the principal o⁄ers the agent a menu of
contracts, indexed by ￿1: Each contract speci￿es for each period t a ￿xed payment St(￿1), along with
a variable pay ￿t(￿1)￿t that is linear in the observed cash ￿ ow ￿t; as given by (10). Both the ￿xed
component St(￿1) and the variable component ￿t(￿1) vary over time, but in the case of a process
that is separable in the ￿rst component, do not depend on the productivity shocks experienced after
the ￿rst period.
A few more observations are in order. First, note that, when the optimal e⁄ort policy is the one
in Proposition 4, then in each period t, the agent￿ s e⁄ort e￿
t(￿t) is downward distorted with respect to
the ￿rst-best level, which is implicitly de￿ned by  0(eFB) = 1 for all t all ￿t: This property originates
in the principal￿ s desire to limit the surplus (equivalently, the rent) that she must leave to the agent
to induce him to truthfully reveal his productivity level. By o⁄ering to those types who are less
productive at the hiring stage (for which ￿(￿1) is high) a contract with low-powered incentives, the
principal makes it less attractive for the most productive types to mimic. As anticipated in the
Introduction, this is because the surplus that a more productive type obtains by mimicking a less
productive one is the disutility of e⁄ort that he can save by generating the same cash ￿ ows as the
less productive type by working less. This means that the lower the e⁄ort that the least productive
types are induced to exert, the lower the surplus that the principal must leave to the most productive
ones.
Second, note that the dynamics of e⁄ort under the policy e￿ is entirely driven by the dynamics of
the impulse responses Jt
1(￿t) of future types to the initial types. The reason is that these functions
capture the extent to which the agent￿ s initial private information ￿1 has persistent e⁄ects on the
17surplus that the principal must leave to the most productive types to induce them to reveal their
private information. To illustrate, consider the following examples.
Example 1 Suppose that ￿t evolves according to an AR(1) process ￿t = ￿￿t￿1 + "t, for some
￿ 2 (0;1). Then Jt
1(￿t) = ￿t￿1 for all t all ￿t. It follows that e￿
t increases over time and, for any ￿1;
limt!1 e￿
t(￿1) = eFB. \\
Example 2 Assume that each ￿t is i.i.d., so that Jt
1(￿t) = 0 for all t ￿ 2 all ￿t. Then e⁄ort is
distorted only in the ￿rst period, i.e. e￿
1(￿1) < eFB




t(￿t) = eFB for all t ￿ 2 all ￿t: \\
Example 3 Suppose that ￿t follows a random walk, i.e. ￿t = ￿t￿1+"t. Then e￿
t(￿t) is constant over
time and depends only on ￿1: \\
The property that e⁄ort increases over time and gradually converges to the ￿rst-best level under
the AR(1) process of Example 1 is actually more general; it also applies for example to any ARIMA
processes for which Jt
1 decreases with t with limt!1 Jt
1 = 0; where Jt
1 are nonnegative scalars that
depend on the various parameters of the ARIMA process.
Note that, as the examples make clear, the statistical property of the process F that is responsible
for the dynamics of e⁄ort is the dynamics of the impulse responses Jt
1(￿t) and not the dynamics of the
correlation between ~ ￿1 and ~ ￿t; or the extent to which ~ ￿1 is a good predictor of future productivity ~ ￿t;
as measured by the variance of the forecast error of ~ ￿t given ~ ￿1: As one can see for example by looking
at the random walk case of Example 3, Corr(~ ￿1;~ ￿t) decreases over time and V ar([~ ￿t ￿ E(~ ￿tj￿1)]2)
increases over time. Nonetheless, e￿
t(￿t)￿eFB is constant over time due to the fact that the impulse
response Jt
1 of ￿t to ￿1 are constant in the random walk case.
Also note that, when productivity evolves according to a random walk, then because e⁄ort is
constant over time, the optimal mechanism can be implemented by o⁄ering in period one the same
menu of linear contracts that the principal would o⁄er in a static relationship, and then committing
to use the same compensation scheme that the agent selects in period one also in each subsequent
period. Each linear scheme (indexed by ￿1) has a ￿xed compensation of
S(￿1) ￿  (e￿(￿1)) +
Z ￿1
￿1
 0(e￿(s))ds ￿ ￿(￿1)[￿1 + e￿(￿1)]
together with a piece-rate ￿(￿1)￿1 with ￿(￿1) =  0(e￿(￿1)) that is constant over time. These contracts
are reminiscent of those derived in La⁄ont and Tirole (1986) in a static setting. Contrary to the static
case, the entire linear scheme S(￿1) + ￿(￿1)￿t ￿ as opposed to the point S(￿1) + ￿(￿1)[￿1 + e￿(￿1)]
￿ is now used over time. This is a direct consequence of the fact that the ￿rm￿ s performance ￿t
now changes stochastically over time in response to the shocks a⁄ecting the agent￿ s productivity.
Also note that while the optimal mechanism can be implemented by using in each period the static
optimal contract for period one, this does not mean that the dynamic optimal mechanism coincides
18with a sequence of static optimal contracts, as in Baron and Besanko (1984). Because the agent￿ s
type ￿t (and its distribution) changes over time, the sequence of static optimal contracts entails
a di⁄erent choice of e⁄ort for each period. What the result implies is that, despite the lack of
stationarity, it is optimal for the principal to commit to use the same scheme selected in period one
also in each subsequent period, thus inducing the same e⁄ort as if the agent￿ s type were constant
over time. Also note that the optimal reward scheme (and the corresponding e⁄ort dynamics) when
￿t follows a random walk coincides with the one that the principal would o⁄er in an environment in
which the shocks have only a transitory (as opposed to permanent) e⁄ect on the agent￿ s productivity.
Indeed, it is easy to verify that the dynamics of e⁄ort under the optimal contract is the same when
￿t = ￿1 +
Pt
s=2 "s as when ￿t = ￿1 +"t. This property holds, more generally, for any process F that
is separable in the ￿rst component, i.e., such that ￿t = ￿t(￿1) + ￿t("2;:::;"t) for some functions ￿
and ￿: the dynamics of e⁄ort is then completely independent of the functions ￿t that determine the
e⁄ect of shocks experienced after period one on the agent￿ s current productivity.
Seniority. We now turn to the key property discussed in the Introduction that the power of
incentives increases with tenure (i.e., with the length of the employment relationship). What the
examples above have in common is the property that the e⁄ect of the agent￿ s initial productivity on
his future productivity, as captured by the impulse response Jt
1 is either constant (in the random
walk-case) or declines over time (gradually, in the AR(1) case, and with a single jump to zero at
t = 2 in the case of independent types). More generally, all these examples share the property of
￿declining impulse responses￿de￿ned as follows.
De￿nition 4 The process F satis￿es the property of ￿declining impulse responses￿if, for any
















Inspecting the formula for the principal￿ s expected payo⁄as given by (12), together with standard
comparative statics arguments, then immediately reveals that, when this property holds, then as long
as the agent￿ s productivity does not fall, the e⁄ort that he is asked to exert under the optimal policy
does not fall either. Declining impulse responses thus provide a condition under which the agent￿ s
e⁄ort increases monotonically over time.
An alternative de￿nition of the diminishing e⁄ect of the agent￿ s initial productivity on his future
















decreases with t: In case the agent￿ s disutility of e⁄ort is quadratic, one can indeed verify that,




)] (as well as
the expected slope of the incentive scheme that sustains it) increases over time. This property,
however, does not necessarily extend to more general disutility functions, for it relies on a certain
convexity property of the principal￿ s payo⁄ as given by (12).
19What the aforementioned de￿nitions of declining impulse responses both capture is the idea that
the e⁄ect of a manager￿ s initial productivity on his subsequent productivity declines over time, a
property that seems appropriate for many situations of interest. This property implies that, as a
manager￿ s tenure in the ￿rm grows, the ￿rm ￿nds it optimal to induce him to exert higher e⁄ort.
This requires a higher sensitivity of his compensation to performance, which can be obtained, for
example, by putting more stocks and options in the compensation package.26
Interestingly, note that the reason why, with a risk-neutral agent, the power of incentives increases
over time has nothing to do with variations in the manager￿ s preferences or in his outside option (as,
for example, in the career-concerns or in the learning-by-doing literature). It is entirely driven by
the fact that, when hired, the manager is expected to possess private information about his ability
to generate pro￿ts for the ￿rm, along with the fact that the e⁄ects of such initial private information
on future productivity is expected to decline over time. Under these assumptions, to reduce the
incentives of those managers who are most productive at the hiring stage from mimicking the less
productive ones, it is more e⁄ective for the ￿rm to distort e⁄ort in the latter￿ s contracts more in the
￿rst few periods, when the e⁄ect of the initial productivity is still pronounced, than in the distant
future when such an e⁄ect is weak. Our theory thus complements the aforementioned two theories
by o⁄ering an alternative justi￿cation for the optimality of seniority-based schemes whose power of
incentives increases over time.
5.2 Risk aversion
We now investigate how the optimality of seniority-based schemes may be a⁄ected by the possibility
that the agent is risk averse. For simplicity, we assume here that T is ￿nite (in which case discounting
can be dropped) and start by considering the case where the agent does not have preferences for
consumption smoothing, so that V is concave but each vt is linear. Using the result in Proposition






















































26As explained in the Introduction, more e⁄ort does not necessarily mean more labor, for e⁄ort in this model simply









































The expression in (14) is the analog of the dynamic virtual surplus formula in (12) for the case of a
risk-averse agent.
We now show how the formula in (14) can be used to characterize the pro￿t-maximizing e⁄ort
policy. We start with an example where T = 2 and where the second-period productivity ￿2 depends
linearly on ￿1 as in Examples 1-3. We also restrict attention to e⁄ort policies that depend on ￿1
only, and are thus independent of the productivity ￿shock￿ which occurs at the beginning of the
second period. Finally, we assume that the inverse of the agent￿ s utility function over consumption is
quadratic. These assumptions help us illustrate the key trade-o⁄s in the simplest possible way. We
will come back to the general problem at the end of the section.
Example 4 Suppose that T = 2 and that the initial productivity ￿1 is drawn from an absolutely
continuous distribution F1 with strictly positive density f1 on an interval ￿1 = [￿1;￿ ￿1] ￿ R. Second-
period productivity is given by ￿2 = ￿￿1 +"2 where ￿ ￿ 0 (note that J2
1 = ￿) and where the ￿shock￿
to productivity "2 is drawn from an absolutely continuous distribution G2 with a strictly positive
density g2 on a compact interval E2 ￿ R; independently from ￿1. The agent￿ s utility function over
consumption is given by V(c) = 1
￿
p
2￿c + ￿2 ￿
￿
￿ with ￿;￿ > 0; note that this function is chosen so
that V￿1 (u) = ￿
2u2 +￿u. In this environment, any e⁄ort policy eND that maximizes the principal￿ s















































































2 (￿1))V ar(~ "2), (16)
27We can show further, under the assumption that log 
0 is strictly concave on (0; ￿ e), that any e⁄ort policy that


























dr +  0(eND
2 (￿1))["2 ￿ E[~ "2]]: \\
As in the risk-neutral case, the choice of the optimal e⁄ort policy trades o⁄ two concerns: (1)
limiting the agent￿ s expected compensation and (2) maximizing expected cash ￿ ows. Contrary to
the risk-neutral case, (1) now requires not only reimbursing the agent for his disutility of e⁄ort and
providing him an informational rent to induce truthtelling, but also reducing the risk that the agent
faces in his second-period compensation (note that, because we are restricting attention to e⁄ort
policies that depend only on ￿1 and because ￿1 is known to the agent at the time of contracting,
the agent does not face any risk concerning his e⁄ort￿ the risk he faces is entirely in terms of his
compensation which is required to vary with cash ￿ ows for incentives reasons). The optimal period-1
e⁄ort is then given by (15) and trades o⁄ the marginal e⁄ect of increasing type ￿1￿ s e⁄ort on his
compensation (the left hand side of (15)) with the marginal e⁄ect of this increase on the ￿rm￿ s cash
￿ ows (the ￿rst term in the right hand side of (15)) discounted by the fact that a higher e⁄ort for
type ￿1 requires increasing the rent of all types above ￿1; as captured by the second term in the right
hand side of (15). These are exactly the same trade-o⁄s as in the risk neutral case, adjusted for the
fact that the agent￿ s utility is now a concave function of his compensation (indeed, it is easy to see
that Condition (15) reduces to Condition (13) for the risk-neutral case when ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1, i.e.,
when marginal utility becomes a constant.)
Also note that, at least when ￿ is not too large compared to ￿, the policy eND
1 (￿1) is increasing
in ￿1 (this is borne out in the speci￿c cases we consider below). As in the risk-neutral case, this
monotonicity follows from the fact that the (measure of the) set of types (￿1;￿ ￿1) to whom the
principal must give a higher rent when he increases eND
1 (￿1) is decreasing in ￿1: However, contrary
























Now let W = V￿1 and note that the e¢ cient level of e⁄ort is constant over time (and histories) and








28Note that, while we continue to denote W as a function of the entire history ￿
2 to be consistent with the notation
introduced in the previous section, in this example where e⁄ort is restricted to depend only on ￿1, W de facto depends
only on ￿1:
29The FB choice of e⁄ort equates the marginal cost of maintaining costant the agent￿ s utility, given by the left-hand
side of (18), with the marginal e⁄ect of e⁄ort on cash ￿ ows, as given by the righ-hand-side.

























, optimal e⁄ort is distorted below the e¢ cient level also
at the top. The reason is that, with risk aversion, the compensation that the principal must pay
to type ￿ ￿1 to discourage him from mimicking lower types reduces ￿ ￿1￿ s marginal utility of money. In
turn, this increases the cost for the principal of asking for higher e⁄ort, which explains why at the
optimum the principal ￿nds it optimal to distort type ￿ ￿1￿ s e⁄ort downwards relative to the e¢ cient
level (see also Battaglini and Coate, 2008, for a similar result in a two-type model).
Next consider the optimal period-2 e⁄ort, which is given by (16). The key di⁄erence between
(16) and (15) is the last term on the right-hand side of (16). This term captures the principal￿ s
concern about exposing the agent to the risk associated with the uncertainty that the agent faces
about his second period￿ s productivity, as perceived at the time of contracting . Other things equal,
this term contributes to reducing e⁄ort, as anticipated in the Introduction.
It is helpful to illustrate these e⁄ects graphically for particular parameters. To this end, suppose












. In addition, let   (e) = e2
4 for e 2 (0; ￿ e) and ￿ = ￿ = 1. The optimal
shock-independent e⁄ort policies eND are calculated using polynomial approximations and depicted
in Figure 1. Note that these policies satisfy the single-crossing conditions of Proposition 3 and hence
are implementable with pseudo-linear and linear schemes.
Consider the case of imperfect persistence, i.e., ￿ = 1
2. While a form of seniority continues to
hold (eND
2 (￿1) is higher than eND
1 (￿1) for most values of ￿1), risk aversion tends to depress e2, thus
reducing the optimality of reward schemes that assign to managers with a longer tenure more high
powered incentives. Furthermore, now there exist values of ￿1 for which eND
2 (￿1) < eND
1 (￿1): To see
the reason for this, note that, when evaluated at ￿ ￿1, equations (15) and (16) are symmetric except










V ar(~ "2). As anticipated above, this term captures the
additional cost associated with a high second-period e⁄ort, stemming from the fact that a higher
e⁄ort requires a higher sensitivity of compensation to performance and hence a higher volatility of
the agent￿ s compensation. To better appreciate where this term comes from, recall, from Proposition
1, that incentive-compatibility requires that the total compensation that the agent receives in each
state (￿1;￿2) ￿ equivalently, (￿1;"2) ￿ be given by




















2 (￿1))["2 ￿ E[~ "2]]
1
A. (19)
It is then immediate that reducing eND
2 (￿1) permits the principal to reduce the agent￿ s exposure to
the risk generated by "2: For high values of ￿1, this new e⁄ect dominates the e⁄ect associated with
23Figure 1: Shock-independent e⁄ort policies for a risk-averse agent when ￿ = 0; 1=2 and 1.
a decline in the impulse response, as documented in the risk neutral case (here captured by the fact
that J1
1 = 1 > J2
1 = 1=2), thus resulting in eND
2 (￿1) < eND
1 (￿1).
Next, consider the case where ￿rst and second-period productivities are independent, i.e. ￿ = 0.
When the agent is risk neutral (Example 2), second-period e⁄ort does not depend on the productivity
realization and is equal to the ￿rst-best level. As explained in the previous subsection, the reason is
that, when types are independent, distorting e⁄ort in the second period does not have any e⁄ect on
rent extraction. Things are di⁄erent under risk aversion. In this case, the agent￿ s responsiveness to
second-period incentives is in￿ uenced by the level of compensation he received (or was promised) in
period one as an informational rent to induce him to truthfully reveal his productivity (as captured
by the integral term in (19)). Because agents with a higher period-1 productivity receive higher
information rents, this in turn implies that incentivizing period-2 e⁄ort from them is more costly
than incentivizing the same level of e⁄ort from less productive agents. As a result, the optimal
period-2 e⁄ort policy is decreasing in ￿1 when types are independent, as shown in the second graph












is increasing in ￿1.
Finally, consider the case where ￿rst-period productivity is perfectly persistent, i.e. ￿ = 1. In this
case, the only di⁄erence in the trade-o⁄s determining optimal e⁄ort in later periods relative to the
early periods is that the agent faces more risk with respect to his payments (since future productivity
is less certain at the time of contracting). Thus, while under risk neutrality the principal would
maintain e⁄ort constant over time, for all ￿1 (see Example 3), under risk aversion e⁄ort is uniformly
lower in later periods than in early ones. That is, we have a complete reversal of the seniority e⁄ect
identi￿ed in the previous subsection.
24Another way the principal could mitigate the risk stemming from variations in the agent￿ s com-
pensation due to shocks to productivity is to respond to such shocks by changing the level of e⁄ort
requested of the agent. This exposes the agent to new risk coming from the volatility of his e⁄ort
(recall that the disutility of e⁄ort   is convex, meaning that the agent dislikes such volatility) but it
helps reduce the volatility in compensation. For example, by asking the agent to exert lower e⁄ort
when his period-2 shock to productivity is high, the principal can reduce the volatility in period-2
cash ￿ ows and hence in period-2 compensation.
To illustrate such a possibility, we now return to the general environment (still assuming that T is
￿nite, no discounting, and no preferences for consumption smoothing) and consider the fully-optimal
e⁄ort policies. Using variational arguments, we can establish the following result.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the agent is risk-averse. Any e⁄ort policy e￿ that maximizes the prin-













































































The above Euler equation sets the direct cost of compensating the agent for additional period-t
e⁄ort after the history ￿t (the left hand side) equal to the marginal bene￿t of the associated e⁄ort
in terms of cash ￿ ows (i.e., 1), reduced by the extra marginal compensation that the principal
must provide to the agent to discourage him from misrepresenting the sequence of productivities in
question.
Interestingly, note that, contrary to the risk neutral case, optimal e⁄ort in period t now depends
not only on the impulse response of ￿t to ￿1, as captured by Jt
1(￿t); but also of the impulse responses
of ￿t to all intermediate types, Jt
m(￿t); m = 2;:::;t ￿ 1:
To illustrate, consider again the case where T = 2 and where the productivity process is as in
Example 4 above (i.e., J2
1(￿2) = ￿). The Euler condition for second-period e⁄ort then becomes
 0 (e￿
2 (￿1;￿￿1 + "2))W0 (W (￿1;￿￿1 + "2;e￿))
= 1 ￿  00 (e￿
















W0 (W (￿1;￿￿1 + r;e￿))
￿E~ "2 [W0 (W (￿1;￿￿1 + ~ "2;e￿))]
!
g2 (r)dr. (21)
30As in the risk neutral case, these conditions apply to all points where e⁄ort is interior, i.e., et > 0:
25Equation (21) can be used to determine how the fully-optimal second-period e⁄ort policy depends
on the shock "2. There are three e⁄ects worth noticing. First, holding constant the e⁄ort levels and
inspecting the left-hand side of the equation, one can see that a higher value of the shock "2 implies
a higher total monetary utility
W (￿1;￿￿1 + "2;e￿) ￿  (e￿
1(￿1)) +  (e￿























that must be provided to the agent to induce him to exert e⁄ort and reveal his productivity. Because
of the concavity of V, the marginal cost of increasing the agent￿ s utility (in terms of extra compens-
ation) increases with W. In turn, because higher e⁄ort requires increasing the agent￿ s monetary
utility, this new e⁄ect unambiguously contributes to a lower e⁄ort for higher values of the shock,
that is, to a policy e2(￿1;￿￿1 + "2) that is decreasing in "2:
A second e⁄ect is captured by the second term of the right-hand side of (21). This term is the
marginal cost of increasing the information rent that the principal must give to each type ￿ ￿1 > ￿1
to preserve incentives for truthful reporting in period one. As in the case of risk neutrality, the size
of this e⁄ect is determined by the persistence of the ￿rst-period productivity, as captured by the
impulse response J2
1 = ￿ of ￿2 to ￿1. As in the risk-neutral case, the size of this e⁄ect is decreasing in
￿1 (since the measure of type above ￿1 decreases with ￿1) and independent of the shock realization
"2:
The most subtle e⁄ect is the one captured by the third term in the right hand side of (21). This
term captures the marginal cost (for the principal) of changing the distribution of second-period rents.
As in the risk-neutral case, a higher e⁄ort at history (￿1;￿￿1 + "2) requires increasing the rent for all
productivity shocks ￿ "2 > "2, as required to preserve incentives for truthful reporting in period two.
Such a change is costless under risk neutrality, since, by appropriately adjusting the payments, the
expectation of the agent￿ s total rents need not vary. In fact, the only e⁄ect that matters, under risk
neutrality, is how the agent￿ s expected rents vary with period-one productivity ￿1, which is already
captured by the second term in (21). In contrast, under risk aversion, increasing the variation in
the agent￿ s rents with respect to the shock to his productivity increases the corresponding risk in
compensation, whose cost is ultimately born by the principal. This is true even though the agent￿ s
expected rents at the time of contracting, conditional on having productivity ￿1, do not change.
The cost for the principal of a marginal increase in e⁄ort at history (￿1;￿￿1 + "2), in terms of extra




W0 (W (￿1;￿￿1 + r;e￿)) ￿ E~ "2
￿
W0 (W (￿1;￿￿1 + ~ "2;e￿))
￿￿
g2 (r)dr: (23)
26Figure 2: Fully-optimal second-period e⁄ort policy for ￿ = 1=2
As one can see by inspecting (23), this term is always positive provided that W (￿1;￿￿1 + "2;e￿) is
increasing in "2 (i.e., provided optimal e⁄ort does not decrease too fast). The e⁄ect is, however,
non-monotone in the productivity shock "2 and vanishes at both the bottom ("2 = "2) and at the
top ("2 = ￿ "2) of the distribution of the shock. This e⁄ect can thus contribute to making the optimal
e⁄ort policy e￿
2(￿1;￿) non-monotone in the shock "2, even if the impulse responses are invariant in
"2, as in the example considered here (compare this to the case of a risk-neutral agent, where, for
constant impulse responses, optimal second-period e⁄ort is constant).
As an illustration of how the various e⁄ects discussed above combine to shape the optimal e⁄ort
policy, consider the parameters of the numerical example provided above. The fully-optimal second-
period e⁄ort policy is given in Figure 2 for ￿ = 1=2. In this example, second-period e⁄ort is always
decreasing in the shock "2, for each ￿1, although (as noted above) we expect this ￿nding may be
quite sensitive to the parameters. Nonetheless, the example serves to document how optimal e⁄ort
may vary with shocks to the productivity, even if impulse responses are constant (c.f., the case with
a risk-neutral agent).
Because the e⁄ort policy e￿
2 (￿1;￿￿1 + "2) is decreasing in "2, and hence in ￿2 = ￿￿1+"2; it is easy
to see that the single-crossing conditions of Proposition 3 are violated for t = 2, making it di¢ cult
to sustain the optimal policy with the linear and pseudo-linear schemes of Section 4.1. Nonetheless,
the single-crossing conditions of Proposition 2 hold, meaning that the policy can be implemented
using bonus schemes as in Proposition 1. (To see this, note that implementability under these
schemes requires that second-period cash ￿ ows ￿2 (￿1;￿￿1 + "2) be nondecreasing in "2, which is true
if @e2(￿1;￿1 + ￿"2)=@"2 ￿ ￿1; a property that holds under the optimal policy).
Next, consider the ￿ndings for the optimality of seniority-based schemes identi￿ed above by
looking at shock-independent policies. Note that the Euler equations (15) and (16) for the restricted
policies are identical to the Euler equations (20) for the fully optimal policies after restricting e⁄ort
to depend only on ￿1 and, for (16), after taking expectations with respect to "2. It is therefore
unsurprising that, at least in the examples we consider numerically, the fully-optimal ￿rst-period
27policy e￿
1 (￿1) and the expectation of the fully-optimal second-period policy E~ "2 [e￿
2 (￿1;~ "2)] are very
close to the restricted policies eND
1 (￿1) and eND
2 (￿1), exhibiting the same properties as described
above.
More generally, we expect the following principles regarding the characteristics of the optimal
e⁄ort policy to apply to a broad range of settings.
Claim 1 Optimal e⁄ort in all periods is distorted relative to the ￿rst-best level, even when the initial
productivity level is ￿at the top￿ , i.e. ￿1 = ￿ ￿1.
Claim 2 When impulse responses decline over time, expected e⁄ort (given period-one productivity)
tends to increase over time when the initial productivity is low but tends to decrease over time when
the initial productivity is high.
Claim 3 When the process is fully-persistent (i.e., when impulse responses are equal to one), expected
e⁄ort tends to decrease over time for all values of the initial productivity.
Claim 4 Optimal e⁄ort, at least after the initial period, may decline in past and current productivity
realizations. This e⁄ect helps shield the agent from risk and, in particular, does not require variation
in the impulse responses.
While we did not formally prove that these properties hold for arbitrary settings, we veri￿ed
that they hold in a range of numerical settings and checked the consistency of the results with the
analytical functional forms of the Euler conditions.
Perhaps surprisingly, note that, contrary to the risk-neutral case, the distortion relative to the
e¢ cient policies need not be downwards for all histories. For example, consider the environment
studied above and suppose that T = 2, with types independent over time (i.e., ￿ = 0). Suppose
that the optimal e⁄ort policy e￿ maximizes (14). Consider the history (￿1;"2) where the agent￿ s
productivity is at its minimum in both periods and suppose, towards a contradiction, that e￿
t(￿t) ￿
eFB all t = 1;2; all ￿t, where eFB is given by (18): As one can see from (22), in this case, the
monetary utility that the agent receives from his compensation is
W ((￿1;"2);e￿) ￿  (e￿
1(￿1)) +  (e￿







This is less than the monetary utility 2  (eFB) that he would receive if the e¢ cient policies could
be implemented at ￿rst-best cost for the principal. This in turn implies that the marginal cost for
the principal of increasing e⁄ort at this history is less than at the ￿rst-best level, contradicting the
optimality of setting e￿
2(￿1;"2) ￿ eFB: One can see this formally from the necessary condition (21),
which becomes
 0 (e￿
2(￿1;"2))W0 (W ((￿1;"2);e￿)) = 1.
28Assuming that e￿
1(￿1) ￿ eFB; the choice of e⁄ort at (￿1;"2) must exceed eFB: By continuity, a similar
property applies to histories in a neighborhood of (￿1;"2). The intuition for upward distortions at
these histories comes from the fact that the compensation promised under the optimal contract is so
low that it makes it relatively cheap for the principal to incentivize higher e⁄ort.
Before turning to an environment where the agent has preferences for consumption smoothing,
we discuss the implications of the results above for what is often informally referred to as the ￿power
of incentives￿ . The latter measures the sensitivity of compensation to performance, here captured
by cash ￿ ows. The fact that, with risk aversion, the optimal e⁄ort policy may require using a
compensation scheme where payments are non-linear in cash ￿ ows raises the di¢ culty of how to
measure changes in the power of incentives over time. One way to proceed is by considering the local
sensitivity of pay to performance, i.e., the sensitivity of pay in a neighborhood of the cash ￿ ows that
the mechanism asks the agent to deliver. First observe that any policy which is implementable by a
bonus scheme of the type de￿ned in Proposition 1 is also implementable by a compensation scheme
where the total compensation to the agent is provided entirely in period T; i.e., for all t < T and all
(￿t;￿t); st(￿t;￿t) = 0, with sT(￿T;￿T) di⁄erentiable in a neighborhood of the equilibrium cash ￿ ows
￿T = ￿T(￿T). We then have that a necessary condition for the agent to choose e⁄ort obediently is




























That is, the marginal disutility of e⁄ort at the desired e⁄ort level et(￿t) must be equal to the expected
marginal e⁄ect of a higher e⁄ort on the utility the agent derives from compensation. Using the fact














































We interpret the left-hand side of (26) to be the expected power of incentives at the truthful and
obedient history (￿t;￿t(￿t)). That is, conditional on having being truthful and obedient in the past,
and on planning to remain truthful and obedient in the future, the left-hand side of (26) measures
how the agent￿ s expected compensation changes (locally) with his period-t performance. Also note
that, in the risk neutral case, this measure of the power of incentives coincides with the slope ￿t(￿t)
of the linear scheme, as de￿ned in the previous subsection.
To understand the dynamics of the optimal power of incentives, it is helpful to observe that the
29right-hand side of (26) coincides with the left-hand side of the Euler condition (20). Thus, one can
see that there are similar seniority e⁄ects as for the optimal e⁄ort policy. In particular, Principles 2
and 3 also apply to the dynamics of the power of incentives.
Finally, note from (20) that there are various histories at which the expected power of incentives






are such histories. Whilst with a
risk-neutral agent, a power of incentives equal to one (which is the marginal e⁄ect of e⁄ort on cash
￿ ows) implies that the agent chooses the e¢ cient e⁄ort level, this is no longer true when the agent
is risk averse. The reason, as is clear from the discussion above, is that the total payment the agent




one should be careful not to associate (expected) power of incentives equal to one with full e¢ ciency.
Similarly, the econometrician should not attempt to measure ine¢ ciencies simply by examining the
power of incentives.
Consumption smoothing.
We now turn to the case where the agent has preferences for intertemporal consumption smooth-
ing. For simplicity, and without any serious loss, we assume that each vt is strictly concave, while
V is linear. To facilitate the comparison with the case without consumption smoothing examined
above, we also maintain the assumption that T is ￿nite and drop discounting (neither of these sim-
pli￿cations drives the results). Because the agent￿ s payo⁄ now depends on the timing of payments,
the principal must distribute the payments optimally over time, adding an additional dimension to
the problem. One way to arrive to the optimal policy e￿ is the following. Using Proposition 1 along
with Corollary 1, one determines the cost for the principal of sustaining any e⁄ort policy e. Once
this is accomplished, one then chooses the policy e￿ that maximizes the principal￿ s expected cash
￿ ows, net of the compensation to the agent.




























































, and wt = v￿1
t . Note that the ￿inverse

















for each 2 ￿ m ￿ T and each ￿m￿1. This implies, for instance, that each term in the ￿nal sum in
the right-hand-side of (27) shrinks to zero at ￿m
￿
￿m￿1￿
, for each m = 2;:::;t, each ￿m￿1 2 Rm￿1,
which is consistent with the case without consumption smoothing as discussed above.
30Given (27), we expect that the trade-o⁄s determining the optimal e⁄ort policies are similar to
those discussed above for the non-consumption-smoothing case. Indeed, these conjectures are veri￿ed
in the numerical cases discussed above with respect to Example 4 with vt(c) = 1
￿
p
2￿c + ￿2 ￿
￿
￿
for t = 1;2 and ￿;￿ > 0, and with V (c) = c. With identical parameter values, we ￿nd that the
qualitative properties of the optimal e⁄ort policies remain essentially the same as in the case without
consumption smoothing.
6 Related literature
The literature on managerial compensation is obviously too large to be summarized within the
context of this paper. We refer the reader to Prendergast (1999) for an excellent overview and to
Edmans and Gabaix (2009) for a survey of some recent developments. Below, we limit our discussion
to the work that is mostly related to our paper.
Particularly related is the empirical literature on the use of seniority-based compensation schemes.
This literature ￿nds mixed evidence as to the e⁄ect of tenure on performance-based pay. Early papers
suggested that managers with a longer tenure tend to have weaker incentives and explained this by
the possibility that the board of directors tends to become captured by CEOs over time (see, e.g.,
Hill and Phan, 1991). More recent papers provide evidence for the contrary (e.g., Gibbons and
Murphy, 1992, Lippert and Porter, 1997, and Cremers and Palia, 2010). These di⁄erences often
originate in the choices about which incentive measures are relevant (e.g., whether or not to consider
stock options). Our paper contributes to this literature by o⁄ering a completely novel explanation
for the optimality (or suboptimality) of seniority-based schemes based on the interaction between
the persistence of the managers￿private information and their attitude towards risk.
The paper is also related to the literature on ￿dynamic moral hazard￿ and to its application
to managerial compensation. Seminal works in this literature include Lambert (1983), Rogerson
(1985) and Spear and Srivastava (1987). These works provide qualitative insights about the optimal
policy, but do not provide a full characterization. This has been possible only in restricted settings:
Phelan and Townsend (1991) characterize optimal policies numerically in a discrete-time model,
while Sannikov (2008) characterizes the optimal policy in a continuous-time setting with Brownian
shocks. In contrast to these works, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) show that the optimal contract
has a simple structure when (a) the agent does not value the timing of payments, (b) noise follows a
Brownian motion and (c) the agent￿ s utility is exponential and de￿ned over consumption net of the
disutility of e⁄ort. Under these assumptions, the optimal contract takes the form of a simple linear
aggregator of aggregate pro￿ts.
Contrary to the above works, in the current paper we assumed that, in each period, the agent
observes the (persistent) shock to his productivity before choosing e⁄ort.31 In this respect, the
31While we abstracted from the possibility that performance is also a⁄ected by transitory noise, in many cases of
interest, the contracts we characterized continue to implement the desired e⁄ort policies even when performance is
a⁄ected by transitory shocks that are observed by the agent only after committing his e⁄ort.
31paper is closely related to La⁄ont and Tirole (1986) who ￿rst proposed this alternative timing. This
alternative approach permits one to use techniques from the mechanism design literature to solve
for the optimal contract. The same approach has been recently applied to dynamic managerial
compensation by Edmans and Gabaix (2010). Relative to their work, our contribution is twofold: (i)
We provide conditions for the implementability of e⁄ort policies that respond to shocks to managerial
productivity and (ii) we characterize the contracts that implement such policies at minimum cost for
the principal. We then use this characterization to determine the properties of the pro￿t-maximizing
e⁄ort policy.32 Allowing for general processes and for time-varying e⁄ort policies is instrumental to
our results about the dynamics of the power of incentives, the optimality of linear and pseudo-linear
schemes, and the e⁄ect of the agent￿ s risk aversion on the dynamics of the power of incentives.
The paper is also related to our work on managerial turnover in a changing world (Garrett and
Pavan, 2010). In that paper we assumed that all agents are risk neutral and focused on the dynamics
of retention decisions. In contrast, in the present paper, we abstracted from retention (i.e., assumed
a single agent) and focused instead on the e⁄ect of risk-aversion on the dynamics of e⁄ort and on
the optimality of seniority-based compensation schemes.
Related is also the literature on the optimal use of ￿nancial instruments in dynamic principal-
agent relationships. For instance, DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), DeMarzo and Fishman (2007),
Sannikov (2007),33 and Biais et al. (2010) study optimal ￿nancial contracts for a manager who
privately observes the dynamics of cash-￿ ows and can divert funds from investors for private con-
sumption. In these papers, it is typically optimal to induce the highest possible e⁄ort (which is
equivalent to no stealing/no saving); the instrument which is then used to create incentives is the
probability of terminating the project. One of the key ￿ndings is that the optimal contract can often
be implemented using long-term debt, a credit line, and equity. The equity component represents
a linear component to the compensation scheme which is used to make the agent indi⁄erent as to
whether or not to divert funds for private use. Since the agent￿ s cost of diverting funds is constant
over time and output realizations, so is the equity share. In contrast, we provide an explanation for
why and how this share may change over time. While these papers suppose that cash-￿ ows are i.i.d.,
Tchistyi (2006) explores the consequences of correlation and shows that the optimal contract can be
implemented using a credit line with an interest rate that increases with the balance.34
From a methodological standpoint, in this paper we applied recent results from the dynamic
mechanism design literature to arrive to the characterization of optimal contracts. In particular, the
32Two other di⁄erences are that we allow for the possibility that (i) the agent is privately informed at the time he
signs the contract, and (ii) has preferences for consumption smoothing.
33As in our work, and contrary to the other papers cited here, Sannikov (2007) allows the agent to possess private
information prior to signing the contract. Assuming the agent￿ s initial type can be either "bad" or "good", he charac-
terizes the optimal separating menu where only good types are funded.
34Other recent papers that consider persistent private information are He (2008), Edmans, Gabaix, Sadzik, and
Sannikov (2010), Strulovici (2010), and Williams (2011). Contrary to these papers and the current one, DeMarzo and
Sannikov (2008), Bergemann and Hege (1998, 2005), Horner and Samuelson (2009), and Garfagnini (2011), consider
an environment in which both the investors and the agent learn about the ￿rm￿ s true productivity over time and where
the agent￿ s beliefs about the likely success of the project di⁄er from the investors￿only in case the agent deviates, in
which case the divergence in beliefs may be persistent.
32approach here builds on the techniques developed by Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2011). That paper
provides a general treatment of incentive compatibility in dynamic settings. It extends previous work
by Besanko (1985), Courty and Li (2000), Battaglini (2005), Eso and Szentes (2007), and Kapicka
(2008), among others, by allowing for signi￿cantly more general payo⁄s and stochastic processes and
by identifying the role of impulse responses as the key driving force for the dynamics of optimal
contracts.35
An important dimension in which the current paper makes progress is the characterization of
optimal dynamic mechanisms for risk-averse agents with information that is correlated over time.36
In this respect, the paper is also related to the literature on optimal dynamic taxation (also known
as Mirrleesian taxation, or new public ￿nance). Battaglini and Coate (2008) consider a discrete-time-
two-type model with Markov transitions and show continuity of the optimal mechanism with respect
to the agent￿ s degree of risk aversion. Zhang (2009) considers a model with ￿nitely many types, but
where contracting occurs in continuous time and where the arrival rate of the transitions between
types follows a Poisson process. For most of the analysis, he restricts attention to two types and ￿nds
that many of the results derived for the i.i.d. case (e.g., Albanesi and Sleet, 2006) carry over to the
environment with persistent types. In particular, the celebrated ￿immiserization result￿according
to which consumption converges to its lower bound, extends to a setting with correlated types. One
qualitative di⁄erence with respect to the i.i.d. case is that the size of the ￿wedges￿ , i.e. the distortions
due to the agent￿ s private information, is signi￿cantly larger when types are persistent, a result which
is consistent with the ￿ndings in the current paper. Consistent with Battaglini and Coate (2008),
he also ￿nds that, contrary to the risk-neutral case, distortions do not vanish as soon as the agent
becomes a high type. Building on the ￿rst-order approach developed in Pavan, Segal, and Toikka
(2011), more recently Fahri and Werning (2010) and Golosov, Troshkin, and Tsyvinski (2010) study
the dynamics of taxes in a setting with a continuum of types drawn from an AR(1) process. Our
results appear broadly consistent with the aforementioned ￿ndings; however, by considering more
general processes and payo⁄s, we shed light on properties of optimal contracts not identi￿ed before
(in particular on the e⁄ect of risk-aversion on the optimality of seniority-based schemes).
7 Conclusions
We investigated the properties of optimal compensation schemes in an environment in which ma-
nagerial ability to generate pro￿ts changes over time and is the managers￿private information. We
showed how optimal contracts can be obtained as a solution to a dynamic mechanism design problem.
We then used the solution (i) to shed light on the properties of compensation schemes that sustain
the desired e⁄ort policy at minimal cost for the ￿rm, (ii) to identify conditions for a given e⁄ort
policy to be implementable, and (iii) to derive the properties of pro￿t-maximizing e⁄ort policies.
35We refer the reader to that paper for a more extensive review of the dynamic mechanism design literature.
36For static models with risk aversion, see Salanie (1990), and La⁄ont and Rochet (1998).
33When the manager is risk-neutral, we showed that it is typically optimal for the ￿rm to o⁄er a
reward package whose power of incentives increases over time, thus inducing the manager to exert, on
average, more e⁄ort as his tenure in the ￿rm grows. This result hinges on the joint assumptions that
(i) the manager has private information about his productivity at the time he is hired, and (ii) that
the e⁄ect of the manager￿ s initial productivity on his productivity in the subsequent periods declines
over time. Both assumptions seem reasonable for many cases of interest. The ￿rst assumption
implies that the ￿rm optimally reduces the power of incentives in the contracts o⁄ered to those types
who are least productive at the initial contracting stage so as to discourage more productive types
from mimicking. The second assumption implies that doing so has more e⁄ect on information rents
when done in the early periods, when the e⁄ect of the initial private information is still pronounced,
than in the later periods when such an e⁄ect has become small.
Building on the results for the risk-neutral case, we then showed that risk aversion reduces, and
in some cases can even reverse, the pro￿tability of such seniority-based schemes. Contracts where the
power of incentives increases too much, on average, over time expose the manager to an undesirable
level of risk. The reason is that the sensitivity of pay to performance is then highest precisely in
those periods in which the risk that the manager faces about his productivity (and hence about his
pay), as perceived at the time he is hired, is the highest.
We expect these insights to be useful also for other dynamic contracting problems, such as the
design of optimal taxes in environments with persistent shocks to workers￿productivity, a problem
that is at the frontier of the new public ￿nance literature.
8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof proceeds in three steps and is based on two lemmas. Lemma
1 establishes that, in any incentive-compatible mechanism implementing the policy e, the agent￿ s
value function at each history must satisfy a certain envelope condition. The second lemma uses this
envelope condition iteratively to show that for F-almost all sequences ￿T, the utility that the agent





W is uniquely pinned down by the policy e and where K is a constant that must be nonnegative if the
mechanism is individually rational for the agent. The last step veri￿es that, if a mechanism ￿ exists
that implements the policy e, then the one whose compensation is as de￿ned in the proposition also
implements the same policy at a (weakly) lower cost for the principal, thus establishing the result.
Step 1. Given any mechanism ￿ = h￿;si, and any history ht, let V ￿(ht) denote the agent￿ s value
function at history ht: This function is de￿ned to be the supremum of the agent￿ s expected payo⁄
over all possible reporting and e⁄ort strategies. We say that the mechanism ￿ remains incentive
compatible at history ht if V ￿(ht) coincides with the agent￿ s expected payo⁄ under a truthful and
obedient strategy from t onwards. We then have the following result.
34Lemma 1 Fix the history ht￿1 = (￿t￿1;^ ￿
t￿1
;et￿1):37 If the mechanism ￿ remains incentive com-
patible at Ft(￿j￿t￿1)-almost all histories ht = (ht￿1;￿t);38 then V ￿(ht￿1;￿) is Lipschitz continuous in
￿t over Supp[Ft(￿j￿t￿1)] and at each point ￿t 2 Supp[Ft(￿j￿t￿1)] at which V ￿(ht￿1;￿) is di⁄erentiable



























s = ￿s+es for all s < t and ￿
#




all s ￿ t:
Proof of the lemma. Consider the following ￿ctitious environment. At any period s ￿ t, the
agent can misreport his private information ￿s but is then ￿forced￿to choose e⁄ort so as to perfectly
￿hide￿his lies. That is, at any period s ￿ t, and for any given sequence of reports (^ ￿
s
); the agent
must exert e⁄ort es so that the observed cash ￿ ow ￿s = ￿s + es equals the one expected by the
principal when the agent￿ s period-s reported type is ^ ￿s and he follows the principal￿ s recommended
e⁄ort choice ￿s(^ ￿
s
;￿s￿1): This is to say that, at any period s ￿ t, given the public history (^ ￿
s
;￿s￿1)




;￿s￿1) = ^ ￿s + ￿s(^ ￿
s
;￿s￿1) ￿ ￿s: (28)
Now ￿x the period-(t ￿ 1) history ht￿1: Given the reports ^ ￿
T
￿t, let (^ cT
￿t; ^ ￿T
￿t) be the stream of
payments and cash ￿ ows in the continuation game that starts at period t with history (ht￿1;￿t) when
in the continuation game the agent sends the reports (^ ￿
T
￿t) and then follows the behavior described
above (i.e., chooses e⁄ort according to (28)). For any sequence of reports ^ ￿
T
￿t and any sequence of
true types (￿T







￿s￿1[^ cs ￿  (^ ￿s + ￿s(^ ￿
s
; ^ ￿s￿1) ￿ ￿s)]
+X(ht￿1)
where X(ht￿1) is a function of the past history ht￿1: The assumptions that   is continuously di⁄er-
entiable with derivative bounded uniformly over E implies that U is totally di⁄erentiable in ￿s
￿t, any
s ￿ t, and equi-Lipschitz continuous in ￿T





Together with the assumptions that jj￿Tjj < k for all ￿T 2 ￿T (which is implied by the assumption
37The ￿rst element of ht￿1 denotes the true productivity history, whereas the term ^ ￿
t￿1
denotes the history of
reports. The last term e
t￿1 denotes the history of e⁄ort choices.









35that the sets ￿t are bounded uniformly over t) and that the impulse responses Jt
s(￿t) are also
uniformly bounded, this means that the value function V ￿(ht￿1;￿) is Lipschitz continuous in ￿t over
￿t and hence also over Supp[Ft(￿j￿t￿1)]: This result follows from Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2011) ￿
Proposition 4.
Now suppose that, given ht￿1; the mechanism ￿ remains incentive compatible at Ft(￿j￿t￿1)-almost
any history ht = (ht￿1;￿t) in the unrestricted game where the agent is free to choose any e⁄ort he
wants at any point in time. It is then necessarily incentive compatible also in this ￿ctitious game
where he is forced to choose e⁄ort according to (28). The results in Pavan, Segal, and Toikka then
























￿t;ht￿1)=@￿￿ denotes the partial derivative of U(￿T
￿t;￿T
￿t;ht￿1) with respect to the











Step 2. Using the previous lemma inductively, then leads to the following result.
Lemma 2 Let ￿ be any incentive-compatible and individually rational mechanism implementing the












with K ￿ 0:
Proof of the lemma. Using the result in the previous lemma and the fact that any mechanism
￿ that is individually-rational and incentive-compatible for all ￿1 must remain incentive-compatible
at F-almost all truthful histories39 ￿t 2 Rt; any t; we then have that, for F-almost all truthful
histories ￿t 2 Rt


















Furthermore, the fact that ￿ is incentive compatible for all ￿1; implies that, for any t, F-almost all




t￿1) is one that is reached by reporting
truthfully and following the principal￿ s e⁄ort recommendations in each previous period. Because in any such history
^ ￿s = ￿s and es = ￿s(￿
s;￿
s￿1(￿
s￿1)) all s < t; without risk of confusion, these histories can be conveniently denoted by
the realized sequence of productivities ￿
t:
36truthful histories ￿t￿1 2 Rt;







Combining, we have that





















Applying (29) to V ￿(￿t￿1) we then have that








































Combining (29) with (30) we then have that























Applying the same steps inductively to each V ￿(￿s￿1;￿s(￿s￿1)), s ￿ t, then leads to the conclusion
that






















Using the fact that the agent￿ s payo⁄ under a truthful and obedient strategy must coincide with the
value function at F-almost all histories and, in the case T = 1, taking the limit for t ! 1, then
establishes the result, with K = V ￿(￿1): The fact that the mechanism is individually-rational for all
￿1 then implies that K ￿ 0: ￿
Step 3. Now it is easy to see that, if a mechanism ￿ exists that implements the policy e; then e
can also be implemented by a mechanism ￿0 such that s0
t(￿t;￿t) = ct(￿t) if ￿t 2 Rt and ￿t ￿ ￿t(￿t) ￿
￿t + et(￿t), and s0
t(￿t;￿t) = ￿Lt with Lt > 0 large enough, otherwise [here ct(￿t) = st(￿t;￿t(￿t)) is
the equilibrium compensation under the original mechanism ￿]. The proof follows from essentially
the same replication arguments that establish the Revelation Principle.
37Having established that, in any mechanism ￿ that implements the policy e; the utility the agent











for F-almost all ￿T;
by the de￿nition of copt(￿;e), it is then easy to see that any mechanism ￿opt where the compensation
scheme is such that st(￿t;￿t) = c
opt
t (￿t;e) if ￿t 2 Rt and ￿t ￿ ￿t(￿t) ￿ ￿t+et(￿t), and st(￿t;￿t) = ￿Lt
otherwise, implements e at minimum cost. That it induces participation by all period-1 types follows



















which is nonnegative under the assumption of ￿rst-order-stochastic dominance in types which implies
that impulse responses are non-negative.
Proof of Corollary 1. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose copt(￿;e) solves program (2) in
Proposition 1 and assume that there exists a period t and an F-positive probability set Q ￿ Rt such





























The argument for the case where the inequality is reversed is symmetric. Then consider the following
alternative policy c#(￿;e). For any ￿ 6= t;t + 1, any ￿￿ 2 R￿, c
#
￿ (￿￿;e) = c
opt



























if ￿t 2 Q;



























if ￿t 2 Q:
Clearly, this scheme also satis￿es the constraints in program (2): The di⁄erence in terms of ex-ante
expected cost to the principal under this scheme and under the original scheme copt(￿;e) is given by

































































2 Q) denotes the ex-ante probability that ~ ￿
t




2Qg[￿] denotes the conditional
expectation of [￿] over Rt, given the event that ~ ￿
t
2 Q:






























The principal can then reduce her expected payment to the agent by switching to the compensation
c#(￿;e) with k < 0 arbitrarily small, contradicting the assumption that copt (￿;e) solves program (2).
Proof of Proposition 2. We start with (i). Consider the following compensation scheme s.
For any t any (￿t;￿t) 2 ￿t ￿￿t; st(￿t;￿t) = ct(￿t) if ￿t ￿ ￿t +￿t(￿t) and st(￿t;￿t) = ￿Lt otherwise,




















































































Under the proposed scheme, given the announcement ^ ￿
s
and the true type pro￿le ￿s, the e⁄ort
the agent chooses in each period s is given by
es(￿s;^ ￿
s
) = ￿s(^ ￿
s
) + ^ ￿s ￿ ￿s (33)











































40The functions ct can be constructed inductively from t = 1 onwards ￿proof available upon request.
41Note that the expressions for the expectations of the future realizations of the process use the property that the
process is Markov.
39denote the expected payo⁄ when, following (￿t;^ ￿
t￿1
), in period t the agent sends the message ^ ￿t, he
then chooses e⁄ort et(￿t;^ ￿
t
) = ￿t(^ ￿
t
)+^ ￿t ￿￿t and then from period t+1 onwards follows a truthful
























































































= ￿t￿1 0(￿t(^ ￿
t




















































￿t ￿ ^ ￿t
i
￿ 0
all ￿t 2 Rt; ^ ￿
t
2 ￿t; which in turn implies that U#(￿t;^ ￿
t￿1
;￿t) ￿ U#(￿t;^ ￿
t￿1
;^ ￿t) all ￿t 2 Rt; ^ ￿
t
2 ￿t:
Because these conditions apply to all t, all histories (￿t;^ ￿
t
) 2 Rt ￿ ￿t; we then conclude that, after
any history (￿t;^ ￿
t￿1
); a single deviation in period t from the truthful and obedient strategy in the
continuation game that starts in period t with history (￿t;^ ￿
t￿1
) is never optimal for the agent. This
result, together with the boundeness of the extension ￿ and the assumptions that the sets ￿t, the
impulse response functions J￿
s (￿); and the marginal disutility of e⁄ort  0(￿) are all bounded uniformly
over t; guarantee that all other deviations are also unpro￿table. The proof follows from standard
backward-induction reasoning when T is ￿nite. When it is in￿nite, it follows from arguments similar
to those in Proposition 6 in Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2011), adapted to the setting of this paper.
We then conclude that, when the principal o⁄ers the mechanism ￿ = h￿;si, with recommendation
policy ￿ satisfying the single-crossing conditions in the proposition and with compensation scheme
as de￿ned above, the agent ￿nds it optimal to report truthfully and follow the recommended e⁄ort
choice at all histories. This establishes that e is implementable.
40Next, consider case (ii) and note that in this case the single-crossing conditions (7) are trivially
satis￿ed at any t > 1: Let wt ￿ v￿1
t and W ￿ V￿1. Let s be the compensation scheme de￿ned as














































































if ￿1 ￿ ￿1(￿1) + ￿1, and st(￿t;￿t) = ￿Lt otherwise. Note that the above scheme is constructed so
that, at each period t, if the agent were to receive no further payments from the principal in the
future, then upon meeting the ￿rst-period target ￿1 = ￿1(^ ￿1) + ^ ￿1, his utility from past and current
payments would depend only on the ￿rst period report ^ ￿1 and be linear in the cash ￿ ows (￿s)t
s=2
generated between period 2 and period t: To see that such a scheme induces the desired e⁄ort choices,
suppose ￿rst that T is ￿nite. By construction, given any history of reports ^ ￿
T
and any history of































































































It is then easy to see that, under the proposed scheme, the agent￿ s decision problem is time-
separable after t = 1: After having reported ^ ￿1 in period one, and having delivered a cash ￿ ow
￿1 ￿ ￿1(^ ￿1) + ^ ￿1, at any period t > 1, and for any possible history (￿t;(^ ￿1;^ ￿
t
>1);et￿1), it is optimal
for the agent to choose a level of e⁄ort et = ￿t(^ ￿1): To establish the result it then su¢ ces to verify
41that each type ￿1 ￿nds it optimal to report truthfully in period one. The payo⁄ that each type ￿1
obtains by reporting ^ ￿1 and then choosing optimally a level of e⁄ort e1(￿1;^ ￿1) = ￿1(^ ￿1)+^ ￿1 ￿￿1 for
t = 1 and et = ￿t(^ ￿1) for any t > 1 is

































￿t￿1 0(￿t(^ ￿1))(~ ￿t + ￿t(^ ￿1))
#
Once again, integrating by parts, one can verify that the single-crossing condition (7) in the propos-








￿1 ￿ ^ ￿1
i
￿ 0
which in turn implies that U#(￿1;￿1) ￿ U#(￿1;^ ￿1) all ￿1;^ ￿1 2 ￿1; thus establishing the result.
Proof of Proposition 3.








denote any arbitrary (￿-measurable) extension of the compensation copt(￿;e)



















































































































among those that satisfy the constraints given by (34).
Next, consider the following pseudo-linear scheme. For t = 1;












+  0(￿1(￿1))[￿1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿1(￿1)]
￿￿



























￿=1 ￿￿￿1vt (s￿ (￿￿;￿￿))
1
A
where recall that wt ￿ v￿1
t and W ￿ V￿1: Note that this scheme is constructed so that, when the
agent reports his type truthfully and chooses e⁄ort obediently, the payments he receives over time
coincide with the cost-minimizing compensations given by copt(￿;￿). From Proposition 1, it then
follows that, if this scheme implements the policy e; it then necessarily implements it at minimal
cost for the principal. In what follows, it thus su¢ ces to show that, under such a scheme, a truthful
and obedient strategy is optimal for the agent. To this purpose, note that this scheme is also chosen
so that, given any sequence of reports and cash ￿ ows (￿T;￿T); the utility that the agent derives from



















The latter is linear in each cash-￿ ow ￿t with coe¢ cient of linear dependence ￿t(￿t) =  0(￿t(￿t)): As
mentioned already in the proof of Proposition 2, such linearity guarantees that the decision problem
for the agent is time-separable: in each period t ￿ 1; after having reported ^ ￿
t
and irrespective of the
history (￿t;et￿1), the agent ￿nds it optimal to choose a level of e⁄ort et = ￿t(^ ￿
t
): In other words,
such linearity takes care of the moral-hazard part of the problem. To establish the result, it then






























































z=1 ;￿t + ￿t(^ ￿
t



































denote the expected payo⁄ when, under the proposed scheme, following the history (￿t;^ ￿
t￿1
;et￿1),
in period t the agent sends the message ^ ￿t, he then chooses optimally e⁄ort et = ￿t(^ ￿
t
) and then from
period t+1 onwards he follows a truthful and obedient strategy. To establish that truthful reporting
in each period is optimal for the agent, we consider the two cases in the Proposition separately.
Case (i): Markov process. Using the de￿nitions of s and copt(￿;￿) and the fact that the
























































































































￿t ￿ ^ ￿t
i
￿ 0
44all ￿t 2 Rt; ^ ￿
t
2 ￿t; which in turn implies that U#(￿t;^ ￿
t￿1
;￿t;et￿1) ￿ U#(￿t;^ ￿
t
;et￿1) all ￿t 2
Rt; ^ ￿
t
2 ￿t: As argued in the proof of Proposition 2, these conditions guarantee that, after any
history (￿t;^ ￿
t￿1
;et￿1), a single deviation in period t from the truthful and obedient strategy in the
continuation game that starts in period t with history (￿t;^ ￿
t￿1
;et￿1) is never optimal for the agent.
The same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 2 then imply that all other deviations are also
unpro￿table. We conclude that the agent ￿nds it optimal to report truthfully at all histories, which
means that the above pseudo-linear scheme s implements the policy e:































































It is therefore easy to see that, under the proposed scheme, after having reported ^ ￿1 in period one,
at any period t ￿ 1, and for any possible history (￿t;^ ￿
t
;et￿1), it is optimal for the agent to choose a
level of e⁄ort et = ￿t(^ ￿1): It is also easy to see that the payo⁄ that each type ￿1 obtains by reporting























~ ￿tj￿1[~ ￿t] ￿ E
~ ￿tj^ ￿1[~ ￿t]
i






































￿1 ￿ ^ ￿1
i
￿ 0:
45thus implying that U#(￿1;￿1) ￿ U#(￿1;^ ￿1) all ￿1;^ ￿1 2 ￿1, which establishes the result.
Proof of Proposition 4. Part (i). The assumptions that   is continuously di⁄erentiable with
 (e) = 0 for all e < 0;  00(e) > 0 and  000(e) ￿ 0 for all e 2 [0; ￿ e],  0(e) = K for all e > ￿ e, together
with Jt
1(￿t) ￿ 0 for all t all ￿t, imply that, for all t all ￿t 2 Rt, the principal￿ s payo⁄, as given by (12),
is strictly increasing in et for all et < e￿
t(￿t); and strictly decreasing in et for all et > e￿
t(￿t), where
e￿







t(￿t) = 0 otherwise. It is
then immediate that when the policy e￿ is implementable, then, under any optimal contract for the
principal, e￿ is implemented in each period t at F-almost all histories ￿t. This follows from the fact
that the principal￿ s payo⁄ in any mechanism that is incentive-compatible and individually-rational
for the agent is given by (12) together with the fact the policy e￿ maximizes (12) and the fact that, if
the policy e￿ is implementable, then from Proposition 1 there exists a compensation scheme s￿ that
implements e￿ and that gives the lowest period-1 type ￿1 an expected payo⁄ equal to his outside
option, in which case V ￿(￿1) = 0:
Part (ii). The result follows from Propositions 2 and 3. Consider the following bounded extension
of the policy e￿ from R to ￿. For any t ￿ 2; any 2 ￿ s ￿ t; let ’s : ￿t ! ￿t be the function de￿ned,





￿t if ￿s 2 Supp[Fs(￿j￿s￿1)]g
(￿s￿1;minfSuppFs(￿j￿s￿1)]g;￿s+1;:::;￿t) if ￿s < minfSupp[Fs(￿j￿s￿1)]g
(￿s￿1;maxfSupp[Fs(￿j￿s￿1)]g;￿s+1;:::;￿t) if ￿s > maxfSupp[Fs(￿j￿s￿1)]g
.
For all ￿1 2 ￿1, then let ￿1 (￿1) ￿ ￿1, while for any t ￿ 2; let ￿t : ￿t ! Rt be the function de￿ned,
for all ￿t 2 ￿t, by ￿t(￿t) ￿ ’t ￿ ’t￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’2(￿t). Note that the function ￿t maps each vector
of reports ￿t 2 ￿tnRt into a vector of reports ^ ￿
t
= (￿t
s(￿t)) 2 Rt. This is obtained by replacing




l=1 is smaller than any feasible
type with ^ ￿s = minfSupp[Fs(￿j^ ￿
s￿1
)]g, and, likewise, by replacing any report ￿s that is higher than
any feasible type with ^ ￿s = maxfSupp[Fs(￿j^ ￿
s￿1
)]g:
Now, let ￿ be the recommendation policy given by ￿t(￿t) = e￿
t(￿t(￿t)) all t; all ￿t 2 ￿t: Clearly,
when ￿t = Rt all t, the policy ￿ is simply the policy which recommends the equilibrium e⁄ort at
all histories irrespective of whether or not the agent has been truthful in the past. When, instead,
Rt ￿ ￿t for some t; the policy ￿ is obtained by replacing the reports that indicate a departure from
truthtelling in past periods with the reports ￿t(￿t) and then recommending the equilibrium e⁄ort
e￿
t(￿t(￿t)) for the type history ￿t(￿t).
Assumption (b) in the proposition guarantees that each function e￿
t(￿t) is nondecreasing. By
construction, each function ￿t(￿t) is also nondecreasing. We conclude that the extension ￿ constructed
above satis￿es not only the single-crossing conditions (7) of Proposition 2 but also the stronger
conditions (8) of Proposition 3. From the results in those propositions, we then conclude that when,
in addition, F is Markov or each function Jt
1(￿t) depends on ￿tonly through ￿1 (in which case so
46does each function ￿t), then the policy e￿ can be implemented at minimum costs by both the bonus
schemes of Proposition 1 and by the linear schemes of Proposition 3.
Proof of Example 4. The proof follows from the result in Proposition 5, after restricting
e⁄ort to depend only on ￿1 and, for (16), after taking expectations with respect to "2.
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose that e￿ maximizes the principal￿ s payo⁄ (14). For each t,
let kt 2 R be a scalar and yt : Rt ! R be a measurable function. Consider the expression for the
principal￿ s payo⁄ (14), evaluated at the perturbed solution e￿ +ky given by e￿
t(￿t)+ktyt(￿t) all t all
￿t 2 Rt: Then a necessary condition for the optimality of the policy e￿ is that, for all t; the derivative































































































































































































































































Ignoring corner solutions, this condition holds for all measurable functions yt (￿) only if the term in
the inner bracket is equal to zero for F￿almost all ￿t, which leads to the Euler condition (20).
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